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Abstract 
The present thesis investigates the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth in 
Vietnam from 1993 to 2012. The main objective is to contribute to a better understanding of the 
reality of aid-growth relationship in Vietnam, how and through which channels aid may influence 
outcomes, and what make aid works better or less well.  
In the research, growth accounting analysis is conducted to regconize contributions of foreign 
assistance to production factors. An empirical model is estimated using the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lagged (ARDL) approach to cointegration for the purpose of evaluating of the direct 
impact of aid on final economic outcome. Additionally, the study conducts an analysis reviewing 
both positive and negative effects of foreign aid across different sectors. 
The empirical results indicate that foreign aid has a significantly positive role in promoting 
economic growth in Vietnam. The results of growth accounting exercise and the analysis of 
fundamental channels through which aid has contributed to development outcomes also obtain 
more evidence supporting the beneficial impacts of aid, especially on macroeconomic 
management, infrastructure, and human capital accumulation. However, at the same time, such aid-
related problems as high volatility and unpredictability of the inflow, absorptive capacity 
constraints, and rent seeking behavior could burden the recipient‘s administration and in turn, 
undermine the aid effectiveness.  
Based on these findings, a set of policy implications has been suggested. Firstly, Vietnamese 
government and its donor community should put more effort into improving the coordination 
among involved parties. Secondly, the analysis implies the importance of systematic evaluations of 
completed aid programs and projects. Thirdly, the quality of institution and managerial capacity 
should be strengthened in addition to aid effort. Fourthly, Vietnam needs to be acutely conscious of 
the problems involving due to high volatility and unpredictability of aid and then implement 
necessary measures to alleviate pressure on fiscal management. Finally, there is a need to adopt a 
more self-sustainable approach in enhancing economic growth in the long-run. 
 
Keywords Vietnam, foreign aid, economic growth, ARDL, growth accounting, growth 
determinants 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
It is widely common that the domestic capital needed to promote economic growth in developing 
countries is insufficient. Foreign aid therefore becomes one potential external capital that is 
expected to significantly boost economic development in developing countries. Accordingly, the 
debate on the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth has been greatly heightened 
for decades. Although economic theories are fairly consistent with respect to the pivotal role of 
aid in spurring growth, the empirical evidence has remained controversial. While some studies 
have found the significantly positive relationship between foreign aid and final economic 
outcomes (e.g. Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, 2000; Channing Arndt et al., 2010; Juselius et al., 
2014), others have reached to the conclusion of insignificant or even significantly negative 
relation. For example, Easterly (2003) asserts a skeptical viewpoint about aid‘s role and 
concludes that aid cannot buy growth.  
The debate seems to be mainly driven by the results from cross-country regression analyses, 
whilst there have been few studies that adopt specific-country approach to investigate the impact 
of aid on growth. However, it should be noted that the aid effectiveness is diverse across 
countries. Although cross-country empirical analyses have progressively developed and 
enormously contributed to our understanding of aid-growth link, there is clear need for country 
case studies to practicably capture country-specific heterogeneous features. Hence, this study 
makes a contribution to the less researched country-level literature on aid effectiveness. 
With respect to country specificity, Vietnam appears to be an interesting case study. Vietnam has 
received impressively increasing amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) since 1993 
and been one of the major ODA recipients in South East Asia region. There is a general belief 
that foreign aid programs and projects have made substantial contribution to Vietnam‘s success 
in achieving remarkable economic growth since 1990s. However, to date, research evidence 
remains scant and ambiguous. In fact, there have been only a few available empirical studies that 
undertook some investigations into the impact of external assistance on growth (e.g. Chengang 
Wang and V.N. Balasubramanyam, 2011; Yin Pui Mun and Lau Sim Yee, 2013; and Hong, 
2014); yet the final conclusion has still been debatable. Moreover, earlier research appears to 
lack comprehensive analysis which probes the impact of aid on the basis of understanding the 
nature of aid inflow to the country and the specific mechanisms through which aid has affected 
economic development. Therefore, this indicates that there is a need for more in-depth and 
comprehensive investigation on the aid-growth relationship in this aid-abundant country.  
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The present research employs pluralistic methodological approach to assess the impact of foreign 
aid for the purpose of delivering more robust results. At first, the growth accounting analysis is 
conducted in order to sketch out the sources of economic outcomes and then link them to the 
contribution of foreign assistance. The estimation of the direct aid impact is carried out using the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lagged (ARDL) approach to cointegration for the period 1993-2012. 
This approach avoids the problem of unit roots and yields valid coefficient estimates even in the 
presence of endogenous regressors. Additionally, the study conducts an analysis reviewing both 
positive growth-enhancing effects and negative growth-retarding effects of foreign aid across 
different sectors. The approach aims to capture various channels through which external aid can 
influence final economic outcomes.  
1.1 Research objectives 
The main purpose of the present thesis is to provide a country-specific study of aid and growth in 
one of the largest aid recipients in the world. The final target of the research is not to put out a 
conclusive statement on whether or not aid is effective in promoting economic growth in 
Vietnam. Rather it is hoped that the study would contribute to a better understanding of the 
reality of aid-growth relationship in Vietnam, how and through which channels aid may 
influence outcomes, and what make aid works better or less well.  
On the basis of better comprehension of the factors that might improve or undermine aid 
effectiveness, this research is expected to contribute some discussions on ways that make aid 
works better. Accordingly, the study would attempt to come up with policy implications in order 
to improve aid effectiveness in Vietnam. 
1.2 Research questions 
In order to conduct the research, some relevant questions include: 
• What does empirical evidence show regarding the link between foreign aid and economic 
growth? 
• Which are the specific channels through which aid can positively and negatively 
influence on final economic outcomes? 
• How has foreign aid impacted on Vietnam‘s growth and developmental outcomes? 
• What are the potential challenges to efficiently allocate and implement external aid 
inflow? 
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• How can Vietnam handle the negative impacts and maximize the benefits from future aid 
in order to effectively foster economic development?  
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The present thesis is divided into seven chapters. The present chapter introduces the research 
topic as well as explains the aim, the objectives, and the research questions of the study. The 
chapter two presents the highlights of the theoretical and empirical literature and reviews the 
history and characters of aid inflow to Vietnam since 1993. The chapter three explains 
methodologies used to estimate aid-growth relationship and data sources. The chapter four goes 
on to document the results of both estimation methodologies employed. Chapter five and six 
discuss the positive and negative impacts of aid across different sectors, covering aid 
management. The final chapter concludes.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
2.1 Economic theory and literature review 
The purpose of this section is to give the reader a brief review of the literature relevant to the 
present study. The section will continue as follows: the theoretical basis that conceptualizes the 
role of external assistance in economic development, the empirical evidence, and the review of 
methodology.  
In the early literature, foreign aid is considered as a driving force for economic growth through 
physical capital accumulation in recipient countries. The Harrod – Domar model of economic 
growth, which implies that investment is the only factor determining growth, is one popular 
conceptual framework being used to justify the aid growth relationship. With investment 
assumed to be equal to savings, the model explains that poor countries suffer low economic 
growth due to the saving gap, which happens when domestic savings are insufficient to finance 
the level of investment required to achieve the desired growth rate. Foreign aid is thus expected 
to play a supportive role in spurring growth by supplementing to domestic savings and filling up 
the gap. Primarily based on the Harrod – Domar model, the two-gap model of Chenery and 
Strout (1966) made a significant contribution to foreign aid literature by focusing on not only the 
saving gap but also the foreign exchange gap. The two-gap model points out that international 
trade and foreign exchange besides domestic savings are also important to the development of 
one economy and that a gap between import requirements for a given level of production and 
foreign exchange earnings can reduce economic growth by constraining both imports and 
savings. Developing countries barely overcome the shortage of foreign exchange by their own 
resources and hence foreign aid supposedly helps to relax this constraint.  
The above models have however received some criticism as they do not allow the substitution of 
labor for capital and assume the stable linear relationship between investment and growth. 
Eventually, further growth models have been developed trying to solve those drawbacks of 
previous models and contributing to literature on assessment of the impact of foreign aid on 
economic growth. The Solow-style neoclassical model, in which capital and labor are 
substitutable and exhibit diminishing return to scale, is considered as an alternative to the Harrod 
– Domar growth model. The model continuously affirms the crucial role of capital accumulation, 
part of which constitutes foreign aid, in promoting growth. However, in the model, there is no 
permanent causal relationship between investment and growth (Easterly, 2003) and therefore, it 
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restricts the use of the basic neoclassical model to study the impact of aid on growth over the 
long-run.  
An alternative to the neoclassical growth models, endogenous growth models, take into account 
a complex set of inputs besides physical capital as determinants of economic growth, such as 
technology, human capital, intermediate new goods, organizational capital, social capital, and 
institutional design (Easterly, 2003). The model has become a popular theoretical framework 
used in current aid-growth empirical investigations since it remedies the shortcomings of the 
neoclassical model of economic growth and provides additional empirical relevance and 
explanatory power (Sakyi, 2011). In particular, the assumption of increasing returns to capital of 
endogenous growth model implies that foreign aid may improve growth in long-run and 
therefore supports the estimation of the long-term economic impact of aid (Kargbo, 2012). 
Furthermore, the model assumes the non-linear relationship between investment and growth (as 
opposed to the neoclassical growth model); and so there would be the case of measuring ―the 
quality of investment‖ and the quality of foreign aid (Easterly, 2003). Based on this model, the 
contribution of external assistance to growth can be estimated through other factors in addition to 
capital accumulation. The endogenous model, for instance, also stresses the critical role of 
human capital in the growth process; and therefore this justifies the assessment of foreign aid on 
building up human capital in recipient countries. Indeed, aid in the forms of both technical 
assistance and investment in education and health care system potentially fosters human capacity 
building and then production outcomes (Kargbo, 2012).  
Following the aforementioned growth theories, the debate on whether foreign aid in actuality has 
been effective in propelling economic growth has intensified over the last few decades. Being 
cognizant of the enormous amount of the existing empirical studies on aid-growth relationship, 
this paper will limit the review to the analysis of the main characteristics of aid effectiveness 
literature and its methodological development. The overview of empirical literature can be 
described through four main features. Firstly, the final conclusion regarding the positively 
contributing impact of foreign assistance on economic growth remains fairly controversial. On 
the one hand, studies have found that aid successfully promotes economic growth in recipient 
countries
1
. On the other hand, some conclude that the impact of aid on growth appears to be 
statistically insignificant or even negative and significant
2
. Juselius et al. (2014) argue that this 
divergence is attributed to the differences in analytical framework utilization, estimation 
                                                             
1 See (Mosley, 1980); (Mosley et al., 1987)); (Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp, 2000); (Carl-Johan Dalgaard et al., 
2004); (Channing Arndt et al., 2010); (Matthijs Lof et al., 2013). 
2 See (Easterly, 2003); (Rajan, R.G. and Subramanian, A., 2008); (Nowak-Lehmann et al., 2012). 
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methodology, variable specifications, and initial assumptions. Indeed, basing on same data 
sources covering 131 countries over the period 1960-2006 as those used in Nowak-Lehmann et 
al. (2012), Matthijs Lof et al. (2013) employ different econometric model and find positive and 
statistically significant long-run effect of aid on income, which is opposed to the former‘s result. 
Secondly, empirical literature presents a mounting concern about the conditional relationship 
between aid and growth, in which aid works in some circumstances but not in others, depending 
on the characteristics of the recipient countries - e.g. policy, political environment, economic 
vulnerability, or geographical characters. During early 2000s, Craig Burnside and David Dollar 
(2000) attracted considerable attention from academia with the idea of testing the aid-growth 
relation in the presence of policy. Although some papers agree with Burnside and Dollar‘s 
conclusion that foreign aid only work in good policy circumstance
3
,  quite many others criticize 
the methodology approach and challenge the result. Typically, Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp 
(2000) find that the aid-growth link is signigicant and positive, regardless of an unfavorable 
policy environment. Moreover, Easterly et al. (2004), by using the same variable specifications 
as Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000) did but with updated data sample, argue that the role 
of policy in determining the foreign aid effectiveness disappears. Other examples of this 
―conditional‖ strand of the literature are Chauvet, L. and P. Guillaumont (2004) which revisit the 
relationship between foreign aid and growth while making assumptions that aid effectiveness 
depends on policy, structural economic vulnerability, and political instability; or Carl-Johan 
Dalgaard et al. (2004) which find that foreign aid performance seems to be related to 
geographical location of country sample. 
Thirdly, a recent development in the aid-growth literature is the analysis of the long-run 
cumulative effects of aid on growth. In other words, there is a growing tendency among aid 
studies toward the discussion of non-growth intermediate determinants through which foreign 
assistance might affect the final outcome of the recipient country, including health, education, 
environment and climate change, institution, or politics. Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright 
(2012), for instance, conclude that foreign aid on democracy and governance has a consistently 
positive effect on democratic consolidation using survival analysis for the period from 1991 to 
2008 in sub-Saharan Africa sample; or Lynda Pickbourn and Léonce Ndikumana (2013) observe 
that foreign aid appears to be effective in reducing maternal mortality as well as the gender gap 
in youth literacy regardless of initial conditions of the recipients. Typically, Channing Arndt et 
al. (2013) process a comprehensive evaluation of long-run effect of aid in developing countries 
                                                             
3 See (Collier, P. and Dollar, D, 2001); (Eskander Alvi et al., 2008); (Javid, M. and A. Qayyum, 2011). 
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by thoroughly analyzing the link between foreign aid and a cluster source of growth and deduce 
that ―Aid has contributed to economic growth by stimulating its proximate determinants – e.g., 
physical capital accumulation and improving human capital, particularly education and health‖.  
Last but not least, an overwhelming proportion of aid effectiveness literature is cross-country 
research, which has sometimes been criticized for not being usually informative for country-level 
perspective. Arguably, the impact of aid on growth is far from equally everywhere since 
―countries with very different initial conditions and/or aid profiles may see very different 
responses to aid over time‖ (Tarp, 2009). Meanwhile, cross-country approach cannot capture the 
fact that countries are heterogeneous; and thus it does not necessarily guarantee the applicability 
of cross-country research‘s findings in a particular country (Kargbo, 2012). This therefore 
warrants the need for country case studies in which a particular country‘s circumstances and 
performance would be thoroughly taken into account. On this basis, the present research 
provides country-level analysis by examining the Vietnam aid – growth experience.  
To date, analytical methodologies have been gradually altered and developed with the aim of 
tackling previous methodological limitations and capturing more precisely the complexity of 
foreign aid. The first progressive move is the application of Two-stage Square (2SLS) model and 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model, in which the supposedly endogenous problem 
of foreign aid and other related variables such as governance, investment, and policy can be 
handled. Later on, the availability of panel data techniques makes it possible to account for 
unobserved country-specific factors and exploit variations both across countries and over time 
(Matthijs Lof et al., 2013). For example, the use of panel GMM regressions to revisit the aid-
growth evidence in Rajan, R.G. and Subramanian, A. (2008) was paid attention as it can address 
the endogeneity of other regressors as well as incorporate fixed effects. Recently, new methods 
based on vector autoregressive (VAR) model have been emerged reflecting the new trend of 
foreign aid study - the long-run effect of aid on a set of key macroeconomic variables which 
finally lead to economic growth - including co-integrated VAR model (Juselius et al., 2014) and 
panel VAR model (Matthijs Lof et al., 2013). 
To sum, the review concludes that the debate on the aid-growth relationship has still been 
inconclusive and appears to continue. Notwithstanding, the abundant and diversified aid 
effectiveness literature and the development of analytical methodology have built a concrete 
foundation for further analysis of a country case study, which will be presented in the next 
sections. 
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2.2 Overview of foreign aid in Vietnam 
It would be difficult to precisely assess the impact of foreign aid on economic growth of a 
specific country without understanding the features of aid inflow to this country. Therefore, the 
following part will briefly discuss the overview of Vietnam‘s economic development and main 
characteristics of foreign aid in Vietnam over the period 1993-2012. In the present study, ODA is 
used as the indicator of foreign aid. 
Vietnam has become one of the case studies in development textbooks after experiencing a 
spectacular transition process since the launch of ‗Doi Moi‘ – a homegrown, political and 
economic renewal campaign – in 1986. Prior to the Doi Moi, Vietnam was one of the poorest 
countries in the world due to a century of warfare and ineffective economic mechanism – 
centrally planned economy. During that time, the country was faced with many problems 
including high poverty rate, unproductive and underdeveloped agriculture, hyperinflation, 
extremely poor economic infrastructure, famine, and the trade embargo by the west. Then, the 
Doi Moi has marked an impressive transition from a centrally planned economy to a so-called 
socialist-oriented market economy4 and from one of the poorest countries in the world to a 
lower-middle-income country in two decades. According to World Bank (2012), between 1990 
and 2010, Vietnam‘s economy grew at the annual average rate of 7.3 percent. Other than the 
early 1990s, the only times that growth fell below 7 percent were in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis, 1998-1999, with the annual average growth rate of 5.2 percent, and during the 
recent global crisis, 2008-2010, with the annual average rate of 5.7 percent. Since the beginning 
of the transition process, the supply and demand of external support such as foreign aid have 
significantly increased because of the normalization of Vietnam‘s diplomatic relationship with 
the rest of the world, especially with the west, and the need for physical capital as well as 
advanced knowledge and technology for the rapid expansion of the economy. This naturally 
raises the question how much aid has contributed to Vietnam‘s development and economic 
growth. In fact, Vietnam is one of Asia‘s foremost ODA recipients and still receiving a huge and 
increasing amount of ODA each year. The latest statistics of DAC shows that Vietnam is the 
fourth largest ODA-recipient all over the world (see table 2.1).  
                                                             
4
 Socialist- oriented market economy: a multi-sector market economy oriented towards the eventual and long-term 
development of socialism, where the state sector plays a decisive role in directing economic development. 
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Table 2. 1 Top 10 ODA receipts by recipients 
(US$ millions, net disbursement in 2011) 
 
     Source: DAC/OECD 
Prior to the collapse of Communist Block, Vietnam received ODA mainly from Former Soviet 
Union, Eastern European countries, and China (OECD, 2004). However, the political changes 
influencing these donors during 1990s made the main external financial source gradually dry up 
and led to a big challenge for Vietnam in filling the financial gap needed for economic 
expansion. Under this circumstance, the first Consultative Group Meeting (CG meeting) for 
Vietnam conducted in Paris in November 1993, in which a full cooperation between Vietnam 
and the international financial community was formally established, became a turning point 
marking the resumption of ODA flow into Vietnam. Since then, the CG meetings are held once 
or twice per year in Vietnam at which the Vietnamese government and donors exchange views 
on socio-economic policies and the implementation of the ODA committed by the donors. As a 
result, the cumulative cooperation between donors and recipient has led to the rapidly increasing 
flow of ODA into Vietnam since 1993. More explicitly, the figure 2.1, which illustrates the trend 
in aid to Vietnam since 1970, represents the continuous upward trend from 1993 to present 
period. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), during the period 1993-
2012, international donors have committed to provide over US$78 billion for Vietnam, of which 
the disbursed amount reached to US$38 billion (see figure 2.2). In addition, the amount of 
disbursed funds over the period has been improved, which is indicated by the slightly increasing 
trend of the net ODA disbursement per capita in the figure 2.3. Nevertheless, it is the fact that the 
1 Afghanistan 6 711 5% 
2 Congo, Dem. Rep. 5 522 4%  
3 Ethiopia 3 563 3% 
4 Vietnam 3 514 3% 
5 Pakistan 3 509 3% 
6 India 3 220 2% 
7 Kenya 2 474 2% 
8 Tanzania 2 445 2% 
9 West Bank & Gaza Strip 2 444 2% 
10 Mozambique 2 047 1% 
 Other recipients 100 990 74% 
 Total 136 437 100% 
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average disbursement rate of 48 percent over the period 1993-2012 is still lower than the world 
average rate
5
. This might signal shortcomings in the cooperation between Vietnamese 
government and its donors and weaknesses in managerial capacity of the recipient‘s authority.  
Figure 2. 1 Trend in aid to Vietnam since 1970 
(US$ billions, 2010 prices and exchange rate, 3-year average net ODA receipts) 
 
             Source: DAC/OECD 
 
Figure 2. 2: ODA Commitment, Signed ODA, and ODA Disbursement in 1993-2012 
(Unit: US$ billions) 
 
Source: Foreign Economic Relation Department – MPI 
 
 
 
                                                             
5
The ratios of ODA net disbursement to ODA commitment (2010 price) to all developing countries in 2010 and 
2011 are 80 and 85 percent, respectively. (Source: DAC/OECD) 
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Figure 2. 3 Total net ODA disbursement per capita 
 
Source: DAC/OECD 
The providers of ODA to Vietnam include 28 bilateral donors and 23 international organizations 
in 2012, increasing from total 26 bilateral donors and international organization in 1993 (MPI). 
Of all the donors, Japan, IDA6, and AsDB Special Fund7 are the three largest donors of Vietnam, 
providing about 75 percent of total ODA value disbursed in Vietnam over 2007-2011. With 
respect to composition of aid from Vietnam‘s two largest donors, Japan and IDA, the share of 
loans is much larger than the share of grants, in which the former accounts for more than 90 
percent of the total amount of aid. This proportion partly explains aid composition and the trend 
of disbursed aid modalities in Vietnam. Over the history of receiving aid, the share of loans has 
been usually much larger than the share of grants and continually increased over time. According 
to MPI, the proportion of loans in ODA capital increased from 80% in 1993-2000 to 93% in 
2006-2010 and to 95.7% in 2011-2012. Almost all of the ODA loans are long-term and carry 
preferential interest rate and a long grace period. Around 45 percent of the loans have interest 
rate lower than 1 percent p.a. and a maturity of at least 30 years, of which 10 years is the grace 
period. Another trend regarding aid modality is the increasing share of ODA disbursed through 
general or sector budgetary support and pooled funding (Adam McCarty et al., 2009). The trend 
toward non-project based modalities and using country system provides recipient‘s authority 
with greater ownership but raises the challenges of managerial capacity and moral hazard.  
ODA resources have mostly been allocated in accordance with the priority the Government 
places on economic sectors as well as the preference of the donors. With the aim of creating a 
favorable environment for economic development and poverty reduction, the Government 
allocates the aid inflow mainly to economic infrastructure and services, which accounts for 41.3 
percent of the total aid. Each donor also has specific preference in terms of aid allocation. More 
                                                             
6IDA: International Development Association - The part of the World Bank established in 1960 that helps the 
world‘s poorest countries by providing loans (called ―credits‖) and grants for programs. 
7AsDB Special Fund: Asian Development Bank Special Fund 
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particularly, Japan, the Vietnam‘s largest donor, for the purpose of directing toward concrete 
goals with particular emphasis on increasing industrial capacity and building up country‘s 
comparative advantages, concentrates more than 80 percent of its aid into Vietnam on economic 
infrastructure, then around 10 percent on social infrastructure. In contrast, the United States, the 
sixth largest bilateral donor of Vietnam, mainly focuses on social infrastructure sector, with 
roughly 85 percent of the total aid amount; or France, the third largest bilateral donor, assigns 
about 35 percent of its ODA into Vietnam to the multi-sector
8
.    
Another typical feature of Vietnam‘s ODA inflow is the relatively unequal distribution of aid 
financing between rural and urban area. It appears that the prosperous urban areas such as Red 
River Delta and Southeast tend to be allocated large volume of ODA per capita; meanwhile the 
poorest rural areas such as Northern Midland and Mountainous Areas and Central Highland have 
very low levels of ODA per capita (see table 2.2). This recognizes the fact that ODA has not 
fully focused on the issue of regional disparities in development. The most active donors 
participating in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) are the World Bank, UNDP, SIDA, 
and DfID
9
 since they participated in the joint poverty working group with the Vietnamese 
government. According to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), being cognizant of 
growing regional disparities, international donors have recently put more emphasis on poverty 
reduction in their assistance programmes.  
Table 2. 2 ODA per capita by regions (2006-2010) 
Regions Poverty rate 2010 
(Percent) 
ODA budget 
(US$ billions) 
ODA per person  
(USD/person) 
Red River Delta (Hanoi) 8.4 3,989.47 204.72 
Northern Midland and 
Mountainous Areas 
48.6 409.33 36.90 
North Central Coast 24.0 1,566.05 79.66 
Central Highland 22.2 74.66 15.14 
Southeast (HCMC) 3.4 894.39 71.78 
Mekong Delta 12.6 907.16 51.71 
Source: World Bank, MPI 
                                                             
8
This data was collected by OECD in 2012 which is available at 
http://www.compareyourcountry.org/chart.php?project=aid-statistics&page=0&cr=oecd&lg=en 
9 
UNDP: United Nations Development Programme 
SIDA: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
DfID: UK Department for International Development 
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Finally, although Vietnam has received large sums of foreign aid, the ratio of aid dependency is 
relatively low. According to the data released by World Bank, over the period 1993-2011, 
Vietnam‘s average ratio of net ODA received to GNI is 3.85 percent. Meanwhile, the average 
rate in Sub-Saharan African countries over the same period is much higher, approximately 10 
percent10, of those the ratios of Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are 30 and 24 percent, 
respectively. Specially, in Afghanistan, the largest ODA recipient in the world, this ratio reaches 
to almost 42 percent, representing its extreme dependence on ODA inflow. 
To sum, Vietnam has experienced a robust increase of aid inflow over the period 1993-2012. 
Being allocated to various socio-economic fields, this external assistance is expected to play an 
integral role in spurring economic growth and development in Vietnam. However, the relatively 
low disbursed rate and the current trend regarding disbursed aid modalities have emphasized the 
need to more effectively absorb and use this financial assistance. Moreover, it is the fact that the 
external assistance inflow in the future will be ceased growing and gradually decreased together 
with the higher development level of the country. Therefore, precisely assessing the impact of 
aid in order to maximize the benefits of this assistant source has become absolutely necessary. 
Evaluation and analysis of aid impacts on economic growth will be discussed in the following 
chapters.  
  
                                                             
10
The ratio is calculated from the data of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries (source: World Development Indicators 
– World Bank). 
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3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES 
3.1 Growth accounting analysis 
With the aim of measuring the effect of foreign aid on economic growth, it is necessary to 
proximately assess the sources of growth. Growth accounting approach, which helps explain the 
sources of economic outcomes by decomposing growth rate into the contributions of physical 
capital, human capital, and total factor productivity, is a proper methodology. Within the scale of 
the present study, there are two main purposes of conducting growth accounting analysis. First, 
the results would reveal the respective contribution of production factors to Vietnam‘s economic 
growth over the period 1991-2012 and then be referred to the impacts of foreign aid on total 
output. Second, the exercise is expected to provide a robust informative basis to support the 
analysis of the positive and negative impacts of aid on determinants of growth, which will be 
discussed in the chapter 5 and chapter 6 of this research.  
This study implements the growth accounting analysis using Cobb-Douglas aggregate 
production function with Hicks-neutral technical change but try to include human capital instead 
of labor force as a factor of production. Therefore, the aggregate production function has the 
form as follows: 
Y = A K
α
 H
β
 = A K
α
 (h*L)
β
    (1) 
where Y is GDP in real terms; A is total factor productivity (TFP) which represents the level of 
technology and technical knowhow; K is fixed capital inputs; H presents human capital which is 
the product of labor force (L) and human capital index (h); α and β represent national income 
share accrued to fixed capital and human capital, respectively. The production function (1) is 
assumed to be constant return to scale, which means α + β = 1. 
Then, the original production function can be expressed under differentiating form and trans-log 
form, as follows: 
ΔYt = ΔAt + αΔKt + βΔHt     (2) 
Ln 
Yt
Yt−1
 = α Ln 
Kt
Kt−1
 + β Ln 
Ht
Ht−1
 + A t,t-1    (3) 
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where Δ denotes the rate of change of each term; At,t-1 indicates the growth in a translog TFP 
measure. In present study, the share of fixed capital and human capital in total product are 
assumed to be constant over the considered period.  
The above production function will be used to calculate the individual contribution of production 
factors in growth accounting exercise. In order to complete this estimation, measures of three 
elements including fixed capital stock, human capital stock, and aggregate factor shares are 
needed. The following sub-sectors would discuss the method and process to calculate those 
factors. 
3.1.1. Measuring fixed capital stock 
The fixed capital stock will be estimated using the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM), which is a 
common method in growth literature. The value of capital stock is calculated based on the 
equation: 
Kt = (1- δ)* K t-1 + It   (4) 
where K is the capital stock, I is the investment, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. 
In this paper, all capital goods are treated as homogeneous and applied an annual depreciation 
rate of 5 percent. The same rate of depreciation for the case of Vietnam was used in Le Dang 
Doanh et al. (2002) and Shenggen Fan et al. (2003). 
Following Iradian (2007), we calculate the initial value of capital stock using the approach first 
introduced in Harberger (1978). Particularly, this approach is based on the observation that if the 
capital-output ratio is constant in a given period of time, the capital and output growth rates are 
equal during that period. When reorganizing the equation (4), we derive the equation (5). 
Kt− Kt−1
Kt−1
  + δ =  
It
Kt−1
    (5) 
where capital growth rate, 
Kt− Kt−1
Kt−1
, is equal to the output growth rate. Thus, equation (5) can be 
written as: 
Kt-1 = 
It
g+ δ
              (6) 
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The value of output growth (g) can be calculated by using five-year average annual growth rate 
of real GDP in which the base year capital stock would be centered in the middle of five-year 
period. Since the initial capital stock in this study starts from 1990, the average growth rate of 
real GDP would be calculated during the period 1988-1992.  
3.1.2. Measuring human capital 
Since data for Vietnam do not allow a reasonable calculation of human capital stock, many 
previous studies that implement growth accounting exercise used the data of labor force or of 
economically active population as proxy for human capital stock
11
. It means that all workers 
have been treated as if they are identical regardless of their education attainment, working 
experience, gender, geographical coverage or working hours. However, reality as well as growth 
literature have shown that both quantity and quality of labor force influence aggregate output. 
Therefore, present study at the beginning attempted to measure the human capital of Vietnam. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of data, the measurement could not be conducted. This research has 
consequently used the results calculated from Hyun Hwa Son (2012), which measures the human 
capital of Vietnam using the 2008 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). In 
Hyun Hwa Son (2012), the author develops a measure of human capital taking account of 
different levels of education that people possess and of other control variables using the 
following Mincerian-type wage regression: 
Ln(x) = α + β(age) + β1(age2) + γDsex + εDurban + ρ(Whours) + ηDethnicity +  𝛿𝑖𝐷𝑖9𝑖=2  + u        (7) 
where 𝐷𝑖 are eight dummy variables for each level of educational attainment; the regression 
coefficient 𝛿𝑖 is interpreted as the productivity of the ith educational attainment level relative to 
that of having ―no degree‖; Whours denotes hours of work; Dsex, Durban, and Dethnicity are dummy 
variable illustrating gender, geographical coverage, and ethnicity of the earner, respectively.  
  
                                                             
11
 For example: (Le Dang Doanh et al., 2002), (Mustapha K. Nabli et al., 2010), and (Seila, 2011). 
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Table 3. 1 Productivity weight by level of education attainment in Vietnam 
i Level of educational attainment (𝑫𝒊) Productivity weight (𝑾𝒊) 
1 No degree 1.00 
2 Primary 1.02 
3 Lower secondary 1.09 
4 Upper secondary 1.31 
5 Short-term technical 1.41 
6 Long-term technical 1.58 
7 Vocational college 1.64 
8 Professional secondary school 1.68 
9 Tertiary general 2.14 
            Source: (Hyun Hwa Son, 2012) 
Overall, the results indicate that an additional level of education gives rise to higher earnings, 
which represent to higher productivity weight (see table 3.1). Those productivity weight indices 
are assumed to be constants over the considered period. Then, in order to calculate total human 
capital, it is necessary to collect the data regarding the structure of employment by education 
level. In this study, the structure of population 15 years old and older is used to proximately 
represent the structure of labor force. In particular, the total human capital and the human capital 
index - (h) in equation (1) - of each year can be calculated by:  
H =  (𝐿𝑖 ∗ 𝑊𝑖)   (8) 
 h = 
𝐻
 𝐿𝑖
    (9) 
where H is total human capital, Li is labor force with ith educational attainment level, Wi is the 
productivity weight of ith educational attainment level. 
Nevertheless, once again, due to insufficient data of labor force structure by educational 
attainment, the quality-adjusted growth accounting result, which presents the contribution of 
education to economic growth, is only available for the period 2006-1012
12
.  
                                                             
12 General Statistical Office (GSO) of Vietnam has started to process the Vietnam Labor Force Survey and Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) since 2006. Before 2006, VHLSS was only conducted in 1993 and 
1998. 
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3.1.3. Aggregate factor shares  
One common approach to estimate the shares of fixed capital and human capital in aggregate 
output is to use a priori measure of capital in the range of 0.3 – 0.4 (Iradian, 2007). Present study 
follows this approach by assuming that the fixed capital share is at the middle of the common 
range, 0.35, and the human capital share is 0.65. This share was also adopted for some other East 
Asian countries
13
. In fact, Le Dang Doanh et al. (2002), who undertook the growth accounting 
analysis for the case of Vietnam, used the share 0.4 and 0.6 for fixed capital and human capital, 
respectively. However, as discussed in Rainer Klump and Thomas Bonschab (2004), Le Dang 
Doanh et al. (2002) find that the assumed value of fixed capital share is too high. Therefore, it 
seems to be reasonable to set the fixed capital share at 0.35.  
Another issue that should be taken into consideration is the change of aggregate factor shares 
during the period within the scope of present study. Indeed, with the case study of Mozambique, 
Channing Arndt et al. (2006) allow the labor and capital shares to move with the aim of 
capturing the changing pattern of fixed capital and human capital accumulation before and after 
the civil war. Regarding the present research, during the considered time period, 1991-2012, the 
country did not experience large upheaval that may strongly affect factor shares as the civil war 
did in the case of Mozambique. Therefore, the shares of fixed capital and human capital are 
considered to be constant in this paper.  
3.2 Econometric model 
Whilst the growth accounting exercise is a preliminary step for the analysis of fundamental 
determinants of economic growth through which the impact of aid is indirectly assessed, the 
following part is a further step to directly evaluate the aid effectiveness using econometric 
analysis. The main purpose of this empirical model is to estimate the short- and long-run effect 
of growth determinants, in which foreign aid is considered as one of those determinants. The 
model used in the current paper is based on aforementioned growth theories including Harrod-
Domar, neoclassical, and endogenous growth model. It is consistent among those growth 
theories that capital is an important determinant of economic growth. Besides, the endogenous 
growth model has recognized the significant role of public policy in long-run economic growth 
and then supported the inclusion of policy variable in empirical growth regression. Following 
                                                             
13
 See (Bosworth et al., 1996), and (Bosworth et al., 2003). 
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those growth theories, the empirical model for estimating aid-growth relationship is specified as 
follows: 
GDPGt = β0 + β1ODAt + β2INVt + β3Policyt + β4Crisist + μt   (10) 
where GDPG is real gross domestic product growth rate being a proxy for economic growth; 
ODA denotes the ratio of official development assistance to GDP presenting foreign aid; INV is 
the ratio of investment to GDP, used as a proxy for capital; policy is macroeconomic policy 
index accounting for fiscal, monetary, and trade policies; and crisis is a dummy variable 
capturing the impact of shocks which are not captured by other explanatory variables
14
. The 
empirical analysis uses annual time series data from 1993 to 2012. 
As can be seen, both investment and ODA are included in the growth regression (10). 
Consequently, there might be the problem of double counting since some part of investment will 
be funded by aid, leading to a biased coefficient on the aid variable (Feeny, 2005). In some other 
studies, the authors choose to include the aid variable while omitting the investment variable to 
avoid the double counting problem. Nevertheless, omitting the investment variable will cause 
model misspecification and a biased coefficient on the aid variable as not all aid goes to 
investment (Gomanee et al., 2002; Feeny, 2005). Therefore, this reseach follows the 
methodology of Gomanee et al. (2002) and Feeny (2005) to tackle the problem using Residual 
Generated Regressors technique. In other words, the present study examines the effect of aid on 
growth taking into account the transmission mechanism of investment. In the first step, the 
presence of an aid investment transmission mechanism is investigated. In particular, an OLS 
regression in which investment is treated as the dependent variable is examined. The explanatory 
variables include foreign aid; the availability of credit (Gomanee et al., 2002; Feeny, 2005); 
economic growth (Feeny, 2005); and one period lagged investment to account for the 
dependence of current investment levels on physical capital stock (Gomanee et al., 2002). 
Because the aid investment mechanism exists, the model can move to the second step in which 
the variable INVRES is constructed representing the part of investment that is not attributed to 
foreign aid. INVRES is estimated by using the residuals from an aid-investment bivariate 
regression, which means that investment is regressed on aid, and then substituted for INV in the 
                                                             
14 The crisis variable takes the value 1 during period 1998-1999 capturing the consequence of Asian crisis and 2008-
2011 expressing the shock from global crisis and Vietnam‘s self-induced recession. Mustapha K. Nabli et al. (2010) 
argue that the economy was not well prepared for the crisis and that the global crisis compounded Vietnam‘s 
difficulties. Consequently, the country suffered quite lasting economic downturn from 2008 to 2011 due to the 
effects derived from both the global crisis and the country‘s macroeconomic instability. 
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regression (10). The details of investment transmission mechanism process are discussed in the 
Appendix 2.  
As mentioned above, policy is captured by macroeconomics policy index in the growth 
regression. Kargbo (2012) defends the use of the policy index as it helps to save the degrees of 
freedom in regression and avoid the potentially high correlation with other macro variables. In 
this paper, government final consumption expenditure as share of GDP is chosen as a proxy of 
fiscal policy (Kargbo, 2012; Easterly, W. R. and S. T. Rebelo, 1993); inflation is proxy of 
monetary policy (Craig Burnside and David Dollar, 2000; Javid, M., and A. Qayyum, 2011); and 
trade openness measure which is (import+export)/GDP is proxy of trade policy (Feeny, 2005; 
Craig Burnside and David Dollar, 2000). The policy index is constructed using the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) (see Appendix 3 for more details)
15
. In general, higher value of 
policy index indicates better macroeconomic policy.  
The econometric procedure adopted in this paper follows the ARDL approach to cointegration 
which was first introduced by Pesaran, M. H., and Y. Shin (1999) to investigate the long run 
relationship among the variables of interest. Using this approach has several advantages over 
other counterpart estimators. First, Pesaran et al. (2001) point out that the approach allows to test 
for the existence of a relationship between variables irrespective of whether the underlying 
regressors are stationary I(0), nonstationary I(1), or mutually cointegrated. The approach 
therefore avoids the uncertainty of unit root pretesting. Comparing to Johansen likelihood 
approach, another common approach of cointegration, ARDL becomes more flexible as the 
former is only applicable when the variables have the same order of integration. Furthermore, the 
integration test results of the base model‘s variables in the present study are shown a mixed 
integration order. Thus, ARDL approach seems to be the best option in this case. Second, this 
approach captures both short- and long-run dynamics when testing for the existence of 
cointegration which certainly fits the main purpose of this part. Third, the ARDL conintegration 
approach has been proved to help in correcting residual serial correlation and endogeneity bias 
(see Inder, 1993; Pesaran, M. H., and Y. Shin, 1999). In fact, the potentially endogenous 
problem of foreign aid has been commonly discussed due to the fact that foreign aid allocation 
might be depended on the level of income. This advantage makes the use of ARDL become more 
appropriate for examining the aid-growth relationship. Finally, the test allows the application to a 
small sample size which is the case of the present research.  
                                                             
15 Javid, M. and A. Qayyum (2011) and Kargbo (2012) also use PCA method to calculate policy index when 
estimating aid-growth regression. 
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The ARDL approach to cointegration follows six steps. First, the integration test on the time 
series data must be conducted in order to identify the order of integration as ARDL methodology 
will be invalidated on I(2) variables. Moreover, this is an important step to determine which 
approach is appropriate for further investigation. This paper uses two of the common unit root 
tests namely Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and Kwaitkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) test to examine the order of integration of the time series data. The ADF test is widely 
used to determine the presence of unit root, but KPSS is noted to have stronger explanatory 
power in dealing with small sample size than other counterparts (Yin Pui Mun and Lau Sim Yee, 
2013). Considering small sample size of this case study, we consider KPSS test as the main 
technique of estimation, which implies that the results of KPSS test will be prioritized in the 
presence of any difference between the two tests‘ results.  
Second, we construct the error correction version of ARDL model, which is specified as follow: 
Δyt = a0 + Σ biΔyt-i + ΣciΔXt-i + d1yt-1 + d2Xt-1 + et    (11) 
where d1, d2 are parameters of the long-run relationship variables; a0 is vector of constant; bi and 
ci are matrices of parameters; yt is a vector of endogenous variables; Xt is a vector of explanatory 
variables. 
Embedding equation (10) into the error correction form (11), we have: 
ΔGDPGt =β0 +δ1GDPGt-1+ δ2ODAt-1+ δ3INVRESt-1+ δ4Policyt-1+ δ5Crisist-1 + ΣηiΔGDPGt-i + 
ΣζjΔODAt-j + ΣςlΔINVRESt-l + ΣωmΔPolicyt-m + ΣθnΔCrisist-n + εt  (12) 
where δi are the long – run multipliers. (12) becomes the base equation to estimate the short-run 
and long-run relationship among variables. 
Third, the optimal lag of the ARDL model which means (i, j, l, m, n) need to be selected. 
Following the method used in Pesaran, M. H., and Y. Shin (1999), the maximum initial lag 
length for annual data is set at two periods for all variables. Then, we look at all possible 
combinations of lag within this constraint and choose the specification with the smallest 
Schwartz/Bayesian Information Criteria (SC) value. It should be noted that ARDL-SC has been 
proved to have comparative advantage over ARDL-AIC (Akaike information criteria). 
Particularly, Pesaran, M. H., and Y. Shin (1999) show that ARDL-SC performs slightly better 
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than ARDL-AIC in the majority of the experiments and that SC is a consistent model selection 
criterion while AIC is not.  
Fourth, before further investigating, the specification derived from previous step must pass the 
diagnostic and stability test, which ascertain the goodness of fit and model adequacy. Because 
ARDL model is OLS of the error correction version equation, it must satisfy the test for classical 
least squares assumptions including serial correlation, functional form of the model, normality of 
the residuals, and heteroskedasticity. Specially, a key assumption in the ARDL Bound test 
methodology of Pesaran et al. (2001) is that the errors of equation (12) must be serially 
independent, leaving the serial correlation test becomes the most important one in this model. In 
particular, this paper uses Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, Ramsey Regression 
Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) model, Jarque-Bera normality test, and 
heteroskedasticity test ARCH. Furthermore, the cumulative sum of recursive residuals 
(CUSUM) test and the cumulative sum of squares of recursive residuals (CUSUMSQ) test are 
conducted to detect the structural instability and model misspecification within the 5 percent 
critical bounds. 
Fifth, if the model passes the diagnostic test and stability test, the ARDL Bounds test will be 
performed to test the co-integration which means to figure out whether there is evidence of a 
long-run relationship among the variables or not. Basically, the approach bases on Wald test 
using the F statistic to examine the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0: δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = δ5 
= 0). Nevertheless, the distribution of the test statistic is totally non-standard, which implies that 
the critical values differ from those in the standard distribution. Therefore, this step will use the 
critical value for the asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic supplied by Pesaran et al. (2001) 
and Narayan (2004) to test cointegration
16
. There are two critical values in which the lower 
bound is based on the assumption that all the variables are I(0) and the upper bound assumes that 
all the variables are I(1). If the calculated F-statistic falls below the lower bound, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis, meaning that the variables are I(0) and hence no cointegration is 
possible. In contrast, if the calculated F-statistic exceeds the upper bound, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, suggesting the existence of cointegration between the variables regardless of whether 
they are I(0) or I(1). If the F-statistic appears between the bounds, the test is inconclusive.  
                                                             
16 Because the critical values generated by Narayan (2004) are set for small sample size of 30 to 80 observations, 
they are used for the final conclusion of the test in this paper.  Narayan (2004) affirms that the use of critical values 
in Pesaran et al. (2001) may be misleading as it was established basing on relatively large sample size of 1000 
observations. In fact, Kargbo (2012) and Yin Pui Mun & Lau Sim Yee  (2013) have used Narayan (2004)‗s critical 
values as their benchmark for the cointegration test. 
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Finally, if the bounds test leads to the conclusion of conintegration, the short-run dynamics 
parameters and the long-run effects can be estimated illustrating the short- and long-run impact 
of each determinant on economic growth. At this stage, the error correction term (ECT) which 
demonstrates the speed of adjustment of the function towards the long-run equilibrium is also 
estimated. The ECT has to be negative and significant to affirm the long-run relationship among 
the variables. 
3.3 Data sources 
The data sources related to ODA are taken mainly from Foreign Economic Relation Department 
- Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) of Vietnam. Other data are collected from General 
Statistical Office (GSO) of Vietnam, World Development Indicators of World Bank, and Asian 
Development Bank. In particular, the variables and their units are listed by sources as follow: 
General Statistical Office of Vietnam: GDP growth rate; GDP at current price (billion dong); 
GDP at constant 1994 price (billion dong); structure of population 15 years and older by 
education level (2006-2012); real export at constant 1994 price (billion dong); real import at 
constant 1994 price (billion dong). 
World Development Indicators – World Bank: Investment which is represented by Gross capital 
formation as a share of GDP (%); labor force (person); exchange rate (%); inflation (%); 
government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP (%). 
Asian Development Bank: Domestic credit (1994-2011) at current price (billion dong). 
Ministry of Planning and Investment: ODA at current price (US$ billions). 
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4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Growth accounting analysis results (1991-2012) 
Table 4.1 and table 4.2 present the summary of growth accounting results which are 
demonstrated in five-year sub-period and the whole period. Table 4.1 shows the contributions of 
TFP, fixed capital, and labor force to economic growth, in which education adjustment is 
excluded from labor inputs. In table 4.2, education improvement of labor force is included, 
together with labor population, deriving the contribution of human capital to GDP growth. 
However, the results are only available over restricted period of time (2006-2012). As can be 
seen from the table 4.2, the quality-adjustment leads to a fall in the TFP measure. Additionally, 
figure 4.1 provides graphical view of the results presented in the table 4.2 in order to capture the 
trend of each production factor‘s contribution over the period.   
Table 4. 1 Growth accounting results 1991-2012 excluding educational adjustment 
 
Real GDP TFP Capital Labor 
1991-1995 8.2 2.8 4.0 1.4 
%Y 100.0 34.2 48.3 17.6 
1996-2000 7.0 0.6 4.6 1.8 
%Y 100.0 7.9 66.2 25.9 
2001-2005 7.5 2.0 4.0 1.5 
%Y 100.0 27.2 52.8 20.1 
2006-2012 6.6 1.5 3.8 1.3 
%Y 100.0 23.1 57.5 19.4 
1991-2012 7.2 1.7 4.1 1.5 
%Y 100.0 23.1 56.3 20.6 
Source: Author‘s calculation 
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Table 4. 2 Growth accounting results 2006-2012 including educational adjustment 
 
Real GDP TFP Fixed capital Human capital 
  Y A 
 
Labor Education 
2006 8.2 1.5 4.0 1.3 1.4 
%Y 100.0 18.4 48.2 16.1 17.3 
2008 6.2 -0.2 4.3 1.3 0.7 
%Y 100.0 -3.2 70.3 20.8 12.1 
2010 6.8 1.2 3.9 1.2 0.5 
%Y 100.0 18.1 57.0 18.0 6.9 
2012 5.1 1.1 2.6 1.2 0.2 
%Y 100.0 22.1 50.9 22.7 4.3 
2006-2012 6.6 0.9 3.8 1.3 0.6 
%Y 100.0 14.3 57.5 19.4 8.9 
Source: Author‘s calculation 
Figure 4. 1 Indices of growth accounting results 1991-2012 (1900=100) 
 
         Source: Author‘s calculation 
An analysis of these results suggests three main findings. Firstly, the exercise reveals that the 
high level of economic growth in Vietnam has been mainly stemmed from the high growth of the 
fixed capital stock. During the whole period 1991-2012, fixed capital stock contributes on 
average 56 percent to GDP growth. Moreover, with the exception of the year 1992, fixed capital 
always makes the largest contribution compared to the other two production factors. The result 
reflects the consistently important role of physical capital in gaining high economic growth rate. 
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Fixed capital
TFP
Labor
30 
 
This finding also resembles what are found in many other studies such as Le Dang Doanh et al. 
(2002), Seila (2011), and Rahul Anand et al. (2014)
17
. Of those, Le Dang Doanh et al. (2002), 
whose research covers the period of 1980-2002, explain that physical capital has remarked 
increasing and large contribution to growth from the announcement of the Doi Moi.  
Secondly, TFP contribution has been minor on average and experienced some fluctuations over 
the considered period. Particularly, TFP‘s contribution accounts for approximately 23 percent 
over the period 1991-2012 for the case of excluding educational improvement in human capital, 
and about 14.3 percent during 2006-2012 for the case of including educational factor. As can be 
seen from the figure 4.1, the share of TFP in GDP growth has not been stable over time. In 
particular, during two economic crises, the Asian crisis (1998-1999) and the global crisis (2008-
2010), Vietnam‘s TFP ceased growing or even went negative at some times. Interestingly,  
Mustapha K. Nabli et al. (2010, p. 557) also notice this TFP trend of Vietnam but without 
addressing any possible reason. In fact, this phenomenon was also observed in other countries. 
After implementing the growth accounting analysis for the cases of China and India, Rahul 
Anand et al. (2014) point out that the economic slowdown of these two countries have been 
driven largely by the decline in trend TFP growth. They suggest one explanation that the decline 
in TFP may be overstated if a declining capital utilization rate is not taken into account in the 
contribution of physical capital accumulation. This might be the reason for the case of Vietnam. 
Even so, it cannot deny the fact that trend TFP growth in Vietnam appears relatively low 
compared to other Asian countries such as China, India
18
. This obviously reflects the poor 
technology background in Vietnam and a sort of problems that hinder the TFP growth such as 
low research and development, poor infrastructure, and low level of economic complexity 
(Rahul Anand et al., 2014). 
Thirdly, there has been relatively strong return of education on aggregate output. Over the period 
2006-2012, educational improvement contributes about 9 percent to total economic growth (see 
table 4.2). Based on the method used in Hyun Hwa Son (2012), the human capital indices of 
Vietnam for period 2006-2012 have been calculated. The results indicate that human capital has 
been gradually enhanced over time (see table 4.3). Obviously, this upward trend in human capital 
index has stemmed from the improvement in educational attainment of labor force to the extent 
                                                             
17 Specifically, the contribution of fixed capital to GDP growth is estimated at 69.3 percent during 1992-1997 in Le 
Dang Doanh et al. (2002), 57.7 percent during 1989-2008 in Seila (2011), and more than 50 percent during 1994-
2013 in Rahul Anand et al. (2014).  
18 According to Rahul Anand et al. (2014), during the period 1994-2013, TPF contribution to GDP growth accounts 
for about 35 and 40 percent in India and China, respectively.  
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that more workers have obtained higher educational qualification. Indeed, in 1993, 36 percent of 
economically active working population had no educational qualification and only 6.8 percent 
obtained vocational and tertiary education; but by 2012, the former has dropped by 19 percent 
and the latter has grown to 16 percent (VHLSS). Thus, it can be concluded that investment 
aimed at expanding access and improving quality of educational service provision to the whole 
population, in general, and to labor force, in particular, provides critical foundation to economic 
growth.  
Table 4. 3 Vietnam human capital index 2006-2012 
Year Human capital index (h) 
2006 1.155 
2008 1.182 
2010 1.199 
2012 1.207 
                   Source: Author‘s calculation 
To sum, the findings of growth accounting exercise give a robust basis to further explore the 
contribution of external assistance. It is the fact that foreign assistance has effect on economic 
growth through affecting the production factors. For example, large and rising ODA inflow to 
Vietnam since 1993 may exert positive impacts on economic achievement through increasingly 
accumulating the fixed capital or supporting the development of human capital and technology. 
Based on the exercise‘s findings, further analyses regarding the channels through which foreign 
aid affects GDP growth and the levels of those effects will be discussed in the chapter 5 and 6 of 
this research.  
4.2 Empirical results 
Table 4.4 represents the results of the ADF and KPSS integration test for the variables used 
across the model. Since the ADF and KPSS tests give conflicting results, the variables may have 
mixed order of integration containing both I(0) and I(1). The nonexistence of I(2) among 
variables allows us to conduct the ARDL approach to cointegration.  
  
32 
 
Table 4. 4 Summary of integration test results 
Variables 
ADF  test KPSS test 
Test 
statistics 
(Level) 
Test 
statistics   
(1
st
 different) 
Conclusion 
Test 
statistics 
Conclusion 
GDPG -2.641068 -3.850595 I(1) 0.152227 I(0) 
ODA -2.441948 -6.663141 I(1) 0.337772 I(0) 
INVRES -2.242501 -4.789694 I(1) 0.413871 I(0) 
Policy -0.683137 -6.175153 I(1) 0.683811 I(0) 
Crisis -2.438431 -3.744838 I(1) 0.272749 I(0) 
          Source: author‘s calculation 
 
The error correction version of ARDL model after selecting optimal lag has the form as below: 
ΔGDPGt =β0 +δ1GDPGt-1+ δ2ODAt-1+ δ3INVRESt-1+ δ4Policyt-1+ δ5Crisist-1 + η1ΔGDPGt-1 + 
ζ0ΔODAt + ζ1ΔODAt-1 + ζ2ΔODAt-2 + ς0ΔINVRESt + ς2ΔINVRESt-2 + ω0ΔPolicyt + ω1ΔPolicyt-1 + 
θ0ΔCrisist + εt   (13) 
The model of the equation (13) passes the diagnostic and stability test as can be shown in table 
4.5 and figure 4.2. In particular, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 95% of confidence 
level in the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (RESET) model, Jarque-Bera normality test, and heteroskedasticity test 
ARCH. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests plot the cumulative sum of recursive residuals and 
squares of recursive residuals together with the 5% critical lines. The cumulative sums go inside 
the area between the two lines illustrating that coefficients of the model are stable throughout the 
period of the study at 5% significant level.  
Table 4. 5 Diagnostic results for ARDL model 
Test Test statistic P-value Null hypothesis Conclusion 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test: 
0.006732 
 
0.9479 
 
H0: No serial 
correlation 
Cannot reject H0 
Ramsey RESET test 0.692173 0.5582 H0 Homoskedaticity Cannot reject H0 
Jarque-Bera normality test 0.583331 0.7470 H0: Normal distribution Cannot reject H0 
Heteroskedasticity Test: 
ARCH 
3.957010 0.0666 H0: Correctly specified Cannot reject H0 
Source: author‘s calculation 
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Figure 4. 2 Plot of CUSUM and CUSUM of square of the ARDL model 
 
  
Source: Author‘s calculation 
 
Table 4. 6 Results of Bound test for Cointegration 
Test Statistic Value df Probability 
F-statistic 99.09902 (5, 2)   0.0100 
Chi-square 495.4951 5  0.0000 
Critical value for bound test (Narayan, 2004) (Pesaran et al., 2001) 
 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
1% 4.768 6.670 3.74 5.06 
5% 3.354 4.774 2.86 4.01 
10% 2.752 3.994 2.45 3.52 
 
Source: Author‘s calculation 
Note: The critical values of the lower bound and upper bound are obtained from Narayan (2004, p. 
1988) and Pesaran et al. (2001, p. 300), case III: Unrestricted intercept and no trend. 
 
Table 4.6 represents the computed F-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no long run 
cointegration among the variables. As the value of the F-statistic exceeds the upper bound I(1) of 
the critical values that are extracted from both Narayan (2004, p. 1988) and Pesaran et al. (2001, 
p. 300) at the 1% significant, we can surely reject the null hypothesis. This means that there is 
evidence of a long-run relationship among the time-series variables in equation (13). This result 
allows the long- and short-run estimation of the variables in ARDL model, which are reported in 
table 4.7 and table 4.8. 
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Table 4. 7 Estimated long-run coefficients from the ARDL model 
Dependent variable: GDPG 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
C -14.0635 6.698141 -2.09961*** 
ODA 1.046916 0.594231 1.761801** 
INVRES -0.6586 0.132015 -4.98881*** 
Policy 0.208624 0.052407 3.980827*** 
Crisis -11.6544 2.314093 -5.03625*** 
 
Source: Author‘s calculation 
Note: *** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively 
In the table 4.7, the long-run effects of explanatory variables on economic growth are calculated 
from the unrestricted ECM equation (13). In particular, the long run coefficients for ODA, 
INVRES, policy, and crisis are -(δ2/δ1), -(δ3/δ1), -(δ4/δ1), and -(δ5/δ1), respectively. As the long-
run coefficients are nonlinear functions of the estimated coefficients, Delta method has to be 
conducted to estimate the standard error and t-statistic of each coefficient. Standard errors 
estimation using Delta method is presented in appendix 4.  
As indicated in the table 4.7, the signs of all the independent variables‘ coefficients except the 
one of investment concur with theoretical expectation. In particular, the coefficient of foreign 
assistance is found significantly positive at the 5 percent level of confidence, indicating that 
ODA has been effective in spurring long-run growth in Vietnam. However, investment 
unexpectedly turns out to have statistically significant negative impact on GDP growth. Besides, 
policy variable has been proved to have a significantly positive influence on aggregate outcome. 
This emphasizes the important role of policy in Vietnam‘s economic growth to the extent that 
better policies guarantee macroeconomic stability in both short- and long-run, which finally 
facilitates the business environment and growth of the country. For example, Mustapha K. Nabli 
et al. (2010) point out that the Vietnam‘s high growth rate has its roots in policies of economic 
openness with trade liberalization at the center stage. Finally, crisis dummy variable has 
significantly negative sign as expected, confirming the fact that crises are costly to long-term 
growth and development. 
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Table 4. 8 Error correction representation of the ARDL model (short-run estimate) 
Dependent variable: Δ (GDPG) 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -0.847880 0.231753 -3.658547 0.0106** 
ECT(-1) -0.933704 0.321643 -2.902918 0.0272** 
D(GDPG(-1)) 0.222197 0.242024 0.918078 0.3940 
D(ODA) -0.463880 0.584988 -0.792974 0.4580 
D(ODA(-1)) 0.688973 0.311305 2.213180 0.0688* 
D(ODA(-2)) 0.236796 0.309540 0.764994 0.4733 
D(INVRES) 0.041712 0.085787 0.486224 0.6441 
D(INVRES(-2)) 0.114545 0.143313 0.799265 0.4546 
D(POLICY) 0.052973 0.036892 1.435893 0.2010 
D(POLICY(-1)) 0.094546 0.032309 2.926342 0.0264** 
D(CRISIS) -1.494025 0.310028 -4.818997 0.0029*** 
R-squared 0.927527     Mean dependent var -0.260970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.806740     S.D. dependent var 1.139137 
S.E. of regression 0.500781     Akaike info criterion 1.707367 
Sum squared resid 1.504688     Schwarz criterion 2.246505 
Log likelihood -3.512619     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.760958 
F-statistic 7.678982     Durbin-Watson stat 1.558074 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.010668   
 Source: Author‘s calculation 
    Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Table 4.8 shows the immediate impacts of the explanatory variables on economic growth. The 
result observes a significantly positive relationship between aid and economic growth, ensuring 
the beneficial impact of aid on total output. In the short-run, the contribution of external 
assistance to GDP growth is slightly smaller compared to that in the long-run. The coefficient of 
investment variable is positive but insignificant, indicating that physical capital might appear 
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unimportant for growth in the short-run. Crisis assures its adverse influence on the economy‘s 
outcomes with negative and significant estimated coefficient. Smaller magnitude in crisis‘s 
coefficient than that in long-run elasticity reasonably illustrates the fact that crisis accumulates 
its effects on the economy over time. Macroeconomic policy‘s coefficient is statistically 
significant but relatively small, which infers that the implementation of policies needs a certain 
period of time to have impact on the economy. The statistically significant negative relation for 
the error correction term (ECT) coefficient further insists the long-run relationship among 
variables. The result of the ECT value at 0.93 refers that after a shock, there is a quick return of 
the economy to the equilibrium growth rate of GDP in the following year.  
As the results have shown, investment is observed to insignificantly and even negatively affect 
GDP growth in Vietnam, which is unexpected and in contrast with the results from the growth 
accounting exercise. One possible explanation is that it is not the quantity but the quality of 
investment which does matter for economic growth of Vietnam. Although the growth accounting 
analysis exhibits a detailed picture of the relative importance of production factors in the growth 
process, it does not explain economic growth by the change in preferences or political and 
institutional factors (Neuhaus, 2006, p. 27). In fact, there are a number of deficiencies in the 
Vietnamese investment climate that can adversely influence the returns of investment and 
growth (Dollar, 2002). Such inherent weaknesses in Vietnam as poor governance, policy 
inconsistency, corruption, macroeconomic instability, and weak managerial capacity might blow 
away the positive contribution of the relatively high level of physical capital. An alternative 
explanation is that the model might suffer from specification bias due to limited time-series data. 
However, due to unavailability of data for longer time series, solving this problem seems to be 
an arduous task and should be treated with a degree of caution in further research. 
In conclusion, the empirical model attempts to examine the short- and long-run impact of foreign 
aid on economic growth in Vietnam applying ARDL cointegration method. The result reveals 
that foreign aid significantly promotes both short- and long-term economic development in 
Vietnam within the period from 1993 to 2012. The finding concurs with the aid-growth theories 
and resembles what is found in Hong (2014). However, the result turns out to be inconsistent 
with the findings of Yin Pui Mun and Lau Sim Yee (2013) and Chengang Wang and V.N. 
Balasubramanyam (2011), which conclude that ODA has negative correlation with Vietnam‘s 
economic growth. This contradiction might be attributed to the differences in the methodology of 
the exercise, the assumptions on which the results rest, and data sources and utilization. Indeed, 
those two studies use different variable specifications to what the present research uses. 
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Specifically, although Yin Pui Mun and Lau Sim Yee (2013) also employ ARDL model to 
examine the impact of aid, they do not include the variables measuring domestic investment, 
macroeconomic policy, and crisis in the growth regression. Moreover, Chengang Wang and V.N. 
Balasubramanyam (2011) employ different econometric model to investigate the aid-growth link 
and assume that physical capital and labor are the only determinants of economic growth. This 
inconsistency in empirical evidence therefore warrants further investigation besides econometric 
estimations to better understand the aid-growth relationship in Vietnam. 
On this basis, it would be necessary to figure out those elements that have not been taken into 
account in the empirical model and need further analysis. Present study attempted to include 
governance factor in the growth regression to investigate the role of governance level in the 
country‘s development. It is based on the fact that governance-related factors including 
corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law have been well cited as important elements 
that can influence investment inflow, economic growth, and development. Moreover, the 
relationship between quality of governance and foreign aid is an empirically interesting issue and 
worthy of deeper investigation. Although it seems to be reasonable to expect that aid 
effectiveness positively depends upon the level of governance, Feeny (2005) does not obtain 
empirical evidence of such supporting relation. Some other studies even reach to the conclusion 
that foreign aid can undermine institutional and governance quality (see more Knack, 2001; 
Brautigam and Knack, 2004). Regrettably, the fact that the governance data for Vietnam do not 
fully cover the needed time-series has hampered empirical investigation on this issue. Besides, as 
claimed in Rajan, R.G. and Subramanian, A. (2008), foreign aid may negatively influence 
economic growth by causing Dutch disease, which is described undermining the export 
competitiveness of recipient countries. Those potentially unfavorable effects of aid will be 
analyzed in more details in the chapter 6 of this research.  
In addition, one difficulty encountered when implementing empirical estimation is that the ODA 
variable may not fully reflect the impact of foreign assistance on GDP growth. In fact, foreign 
aid might affect growth through non-growth intermediate channels such as health care, 
education, institution, or politics. Arguably, those non-growth intermediate outcomes are highly 
diverse and it would take some times for foreign aid which is transferred to those channels to 
apparently accumulate into economic achievements. As a result, it becomes very difficult to 
successfully include and distinguish all of these non-growth outcomes in the growth regression 
in order to examine the impact of aid on growth. This demonstrates the need for further research 
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on specific channels through which foreign aid can influence economic outcomes, which is the 
content of the next two chapters. 
  
39 
 
5 POSITIVE IMPACTS OF AID  
5.1 Aid and macroeconomic management 
As discussed above, Vietnam has experienced a long-lasting period of high economic growth 
after the announcement of the Doi Moi. Dollar (2002) shows that the key to obtaining and 
sustaining high growth over decades in Vietnam is the reform and continual upgrade of 
economic institutions and macroeconomic policies, including legal reform, regulatory 
improvements, private property rights, and openness to foreign trade and investment. There are 
two main paths expressing the relationship between foreign aid and macroeconomic 
management. First, foreign aid contributes to the improvement of policy reform, law and 
regulation, and absorptive capacity through technical support and policy advices. Second, 
external financing supports the country‘s current account deficit and provides foreign exchange 
through balance of payment support and debt relief. In general, these two channels of external 
aid assist the recipients to enforce macroeconomic stability and thus encourage economic 
growth. This part would briefly review the macroeconomic performance of Vietnam and then 
discuss in details the role of foreign aid. 
Since the launch of the Doi Moi, the Vietnamese government has implemented a comprehensive 
series of reforms aiming at reducing poverty and obtaining high level of economic growth. Some 
key reforms include price reform which marks the shift to market-determined price for most of 
goods; macroeconomic stabilization program which helps to control money supply and prevent 
inflation pressure; rural reform which involves dismantling a system of collection farming; trade 
reform which leads to the liberalization of the trade environment; and the exchange rate reform 
which includes the adoption of a more market-oriented exchange rate policy (Abonyi, 2005). 
Those reforms have turned out a remarkable progress in Vietnam economy since early 1990s. 
Numerous problems that the country had to encounter before the Doi Moi, such as the annual 
inflation rate was over 700 percent; current account run a huge deficit; budget resources were 
dried up due to military expenditure and loss-making state owned enterprises (SOEs); and there 
was no inflow of FDI, have gradually handled. During 1990s, the economy experienced a rapid 
and steady economic growth with controlled inflation, lower poverty rate, expanded trade sector, 
and increasing external capital inflow (see Table 5.1). However, it should be noticed that being 
one of the poorest countries in the world, Vietnam certainly encountered various difficulties 
when adopting the reforms due to the lack of state budget, advanced knowledge and technology, 
and management experience. External assistance, therefore, plays a significant role in helping the 
country to overcome these initial constraints and then facilitate the country‘s development. 
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Although when comparing to other external sources of development such as FDI and 
remittances, ODA has not occupied the biggest shares, it is the catalytic element to attract the 
other two and support inclusive growth. Arguably, whilst FDI and overseas remittances are 
private sources of finance and profit driven, ODA is much more likely to be allocated toward 
public goods and services with high social benefits (Hang, 2007). 
Table 5. 1 Selected macroeconomic indicators of Vietnam 
 
1990 1993 2000 2010 
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day 
(% of population) 
 
63.74 49.65* 16.85** 
GDP - constant price (VND billion) 131,968.0 164,043.0 273,666.0 584,073.0 
GDP per capita -  current price (US$) 118.0 190.0 402.0 1,168.0 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) (%) 67.1 5.2 -0.6 11.8 
Total export value (US$ million) 
 
2,985.2 14,482.7 72,236.7 
Total import value (US$ million) 2,752.4 3,924.0 15,636.5 84,838.6 
Realized FDI (US$ million) 
 
1,017.5 2,413.5 11,000.0 
Note: *: data for 1998; **: data for 2008 
Source: GSO, World Bank 
The available evidence suggests that external financing has been instrumental in policy and 
institution improvement in Vietnam. The economy can directly benefit from ODA through 
policy-based loans and grants from international donors. In addition, Vietnam might gain policy 
advices from international community through aid conditionality or consulting dialogue between 
the recipient and donors. During the period 1993-2003, the share of policy support ranges 
between 12 and 26 percent of total ODA value. According to Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI)‘s report, for the last 20 years, Vietnam has received and implemented ODA 
funded programmes and projects with a total value of approximately US$834 million for 
improving public financial management system, developing macro financial policies, 
strengthening national debt management capacity, and managing and monitoring financial 
market. The list of main credit programs for policy development over the past 20 years includes 
World Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC-1 and SAC-2) (WB, 1994-1996), IMF‘s 
Extended Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF, 1997), Miyazawa program to promote private 
sector development (Japan, 1998), SOE Reform and Corporate Governance Facilitation Program 
(ADB, 2010-2015), Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC, 2001-2010) co-financed by World 
Bank and some other donors, World Bank‘s Public Investment Reform Program (PIR, 2009 -
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2010 and 2012), and some other programs for sectoral policy reform and development (MPI, 
2013).  
There might be an argument that foreign aid in fact has not had as much positive impact on 
policy reform as international donors have expected since the policy decision process in Vietnam 
is domestically driven and, therefore, donors‘ policy conditionality and recommendations are 
sometimes ignored by the recipient‘s government19. There are two possible explanations for this 
trend. First, a strong sense of government ownership of policy making has been accumulated as 
Vietnam undertook a long time of centrally planned economy before the Doi Moi. Second, the 
country always considers sovereignty as its top priorities in its international relat ion since it 
fought long wars to regain independence and freedom in the past. As a result, Vietnamese 
government tends to make its own decisions on policy decision making and follow those aid 
conditionality and advices that are aligned with the country‘s reform agenda and Socio 
Economic Development Plan (SEDP). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a large amount of 
policy-support financing and internationally transferred knowledge and experiences have 
facilitated policy reform and strengthened policy framework in Vietnam. Moreover, learning 
from some failures in the past, international donors and recipient‘s government have made 
considerable effort toward better harmonization and stronger coordination aiming at increasing 
aid effectiveness. Typically, Vietnam‘s large donors such as ABD, WB, Japan, and DFID are 
working closely together and with the government to come up with a common analytical 
framework for the country assistance strategy (Hang, 2007).  
Besides policy-based loans and grants, donors have actively supported Vietnam‘s 
macroeconomic management capacity through technical assistances, which provide Vietnam 
with a number of consultants, equipment, materials and documentations, study tours, workshops, 
and trainings. Common factors undermining Vietnam‘s development as well as ODA absorptive 
capacity are the limited supply of skilled labors, low capacity of state officials, and weak public 
administration. Thus, donors‘ technical assistances, especially in conducting policy research on 
macroeconomic, sectoral, and local development, have helped Vietnamese government in 
developing the 10-year Socio Economic Development Strategy and 5-year plan (MPI, 2013). 
Some examples of technical assistance projects include ―Dispatch of Individual Expert 02-03‖ 
                                                             
19
 For example, the IMF‘s policy-based lending for Vietnam namely Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) (1994) was canceled in 1997 due to the fundamental differences over the scope and pace of policy reform 
between the IMF and the Vietnamese government‘s reform agenda. Additionally, there was also the reluctance of 
the Vietnamese government to follow the WB‘s advices that were not aligned with the domestic agenda in the State-
Owned Enterprise Reform in Vietnam Project supported by the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit I – World Bank. 
(See more: Abonyi, 2005). 
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and ―Study on the Economic Development Policy in the Transition toward a Market-Oriented 
Economy in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam‖ (the so-called ―Ishikawa Project‖) supported by 
JICA. 
In addition, ODA-funded loans and technical assistance have supported Vietnam in formulating 
and developing legal and institutional framework in the socio-economic management areas such 
as laws, degrees of the government, and other legal documents. MPI (2013) indicates that donors 
have helped Vietnamese agencies in developing various laws and bylaws, particularly during 
Vietnam‘s preparation for joining World Trade Organization (WTO), such as Land Law, 
Construction Law, Enterprise Law, Investment Law, Procurement Law, Commercial Law, and 
Government decrees and circulars by ministries and sectors. One typical example is the US$2.3 
million project of the UNDP to set up the new Enterprise Law, which was passed by the National 
Assembly in 1999 and credited in early 2000s. The announcement of Enterprise Law was 
observed to create nearly 53,000 new non-state businesses and about one million new jobs 
(Hang, 2007). Furthermore, Vietnam has gained considerable practical experiences in 
procurement procedures and processes mainly thank to ODA-funded projects
20
. Through being 
supported by technical assistance – e.g. the World Bank Grant for Procurement Capacity 
Building – and implementing ODA-funded international projects, Vietnam has gradually been 
familiar with international procurement standards and procedures such as International 
Competitive Bidding (ICB) and National Competitive Bidding (NCB) (World Bank, 2002). 
  
                                                             
20 A big proportion of ODA-funded projects are large scale. World Bank (2002) reveals that 45 out of a total of 69 
largest contracts in 2000 in Vietnam were funded by ODA. One can expect that most of donor – financed contracts 
went through bidding since 85 percent of the largest contracts went through bidding. 
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Table 5. 2 Budget Deficits, Public Debt, and Public Spending in Vietnam (%GDP) 
Budget Deficit 
        
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
MoF -4.9 -4.9 -4.9 -5 -5.7 -4.6 -6.9 -5.5 -4.4 
IMF -4.8 -1.2 -3.3 -0.2 -2.5 -0.5 -7.2 -5.3 -2.5 
ADB -2.2 -0.2 -1.1 1.3 -1 0.7 -3.9 -4.5 -2.5 
Public Debt 
        
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Threshold 
MoF 
    
33.8 36.2 41.9 57.3 65 
IMF 33.3 38.9 42.2 43 45.6 43.9 49.9 57.1 
 Public Spending 
        
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 
   ADB 21.9 23.8 22.6 27.3 31.8 30.7 
   Note: Ministry of Finance (MoF): Budget deficit after debt service 
Source: Budget deficit and public spending: (ECNA - UNDP, 2013) 
Public debt: (Anh, 2011) 
Over the last 20 years, the fiscal situation of Vietnam has not been sustainable over time. From 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s, the deficit of general government accounted for 3 percent of GDP 
on average while the public debt was on a declining trend from over 60 percent to 45 percent of 
GDP (Benno Ferrarini et al., 2012)
21
. These proportions irregularly changed during the period 
from 2003 to 2008 (based on IMF‘s calculation) and sharply increased during 2009-2010. The 
table 5.2 illustrates in more detail some fiscal indicators including budget deficit and public debt 
over the period 2003-2011, and public spending during 1990-2010. As can be seen from the table 
5.2, one can see that statistics on Vietnam‘s public debt and budget deficit are very inconsistent 
between the country‘s official data and international agencies‘ measurement such as IMF or 
ADB
22
. Regardless of the gaps between figures from different sources, there are two main 
features of Vietnam‘s fiscal position. First, Vietnamese government has followed deficit-oriented 
strategies for the purpose of encouraging economic growth. This partly demonstrates the 
important role of physical capital in Vietnam‘s development strategy, which is consistent with 
what has been resulted from growth accounting analysis in the chapter 4. Second, although 
                                                             
21 The data was collected based on the IMF Government Finance Statistic Manual.  
22 Those data inconsistencies mainly due to the fact that Vietnamese government and international agencies apply 
significantly different classification of the expenditures and revenues and that potential size of various government 
activities are treated off-budget (see more Benno Ferrarini et al., 2012, p. 189). 
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Vietnam‘s fiscal position remains relatively safe since public debt ratios to GDP are below the 
threshold set by Ministry of Finance (MoF), the fact that budget deficit and public debt have 
increased over the last few years might lead to weaker fiscal situation. This problem might be 
attributed to high and increasing public spending (see table 5.2). Based on empirical studies, 
there is a consensus that the optimal public spending scale for developing countries ranges from 
15 to 20 percent of GDP (ECNA - UNDP, 2013). However, Vietnam‘s public spending ratios 
always go above this range and the gap has been largely widened since 2009
23
. Besides, revenue 
analysis shows that Vietnam‘s revenue to GDP ratio has already been relatively high and that the 
chance to raise revenue seems very small. Many revenue sources are considered to be unstable 
and might slump in the coming years (see more Anh, 2011; ECNA - UNDP, 2013).  
With respect to such fiscal position, external assistance seems to be critically important from the 
point of view of supporting current account deficit and providing foreign exchange. At the early 
stage after the Doi Moi, ODA inflow provided a backup role in fulfilling Vietnam‘s urgent needs 
that were unable to cover by its own tight budget. During 2000s, when the country faces with 
increasing budget deficit and public debt, the inflow of foreign aid, regardless of its volume, has 
been becoming important to Vietnam‘s fiscal discipline. According to the data revealed by MPI, 
ODA financing occupies a significant proportion of state investment, which accounts for on 
average 15-17 percent. Regarding the distribution of ODA disbursement by types of assistance, 
balance of payment support (PBB) accounts for approximate 20 percent of total foreign aid 
inflow to Vietnam over the period 1993-2003 (UNDP, 2004). Benno Ferrarini et al. (2012) also 
affirm that the relatively safe fiscal position of Vietnam is facilitated by its access to 
concessional loans with low interest rate and long grace term and grants. Furthermore, high 
levels of foreign aid inflow certainly supply critical foreign exchange necessary for investment 
inputs and consumption.  
To sum, foreign aid has been proved to be instrumental in improving Vietnam macroeconomic 
management, especially in formulating and enhancing policy. Recalling the empirical results 
which show that policy has significantly positive correlation with economic growth, one can 
apparently see the positive aid-growth link. Nevertheless, macroeconomic management might 
also be suffered from negative consequences due to the nature and volatility of aid inflow, which 
will be further discussed in chapter 6. 
                                                             
23 It should be noted that it is not quantity but quality of public spending which determines a country‘s economic 
growth and development. In fact, recently increasing but ineffective public spending in Vietnam has been criticized 
as one of the main reasons leading to macroeconomic instability. This partly explains the significantly negative 
correlation of investment coefficient in growth regression, which is conducted in chapter 3 and 4.   
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5.2 Aid and economic infrastructure 
The crucial role of economic infrastructure in achieving growth and reducing poverty has been 
consistently observed across literatures. Economic infrastructure involves both physical facilities 
such as roads, energy generation, or water connections and services such as transport services, 
energy, or water supply. From the point of view of positive outcomes, the main target of external 
assistance is to enhance the access of economic infrastructure in the most possibly effective and 
equitable manner. In fact, donors and Vietnamese government have strongly emphasized on 
economic infrastructure development. A large proportion of foreign aid – accounting for roughly 
41.3 percent for the last 20 years - has been allocated in this sector for the purpose of 
contributing to growth, trickle-downing economic development, and redistributing to poor 
people. It is thus necessary to assess the role of aid in improving economic infrastructure in 
Vietnam. This sub-section will focus on analyzing four main sectors constituting economic 
infrastructure including transportation, electricity, telecommunication, and water and sanitation. 
The available statistics indicate that since early 1990s, each sector of economic infrastructure has 
experienced impressive growth in terms of access to service. Over the past 20 years, the road 
network has considerably increased in length. Particularly, Vietnam‘s road network has 
expanded from 96,100 km in 1990 to 224,500 km in 2004. National level roads have also 
expanded from 15,100 km in 1990 to 17,000 km in 2004. The substantial progress in road sector 
has also been made through rehabilitating and upgrading existing road network. By 2004, the 
overall condition has improved, with 66 percent of the network being in good and fair condition 
from 37 percent in 1997, in which 84 percent of the network was paved24. These improvements 
have certainly facilitated the expansion of road transport activity. Indeed, since early 1990s, the 
road traffic growth in the country as a whole is about 8 percent per annum, being higher than the 
growth rate of GDP which reaches to nearly 7 percent per annum25. In terms of water and 
sanitary condition, access to improved water sources has increased from 26 percent of the 
population in 1993 to 98 percent at urban areas and 89 percent at rural areas in 2011 (source: 
World Bank). Regarding accessing to electricity, to date, all urban areas are electrified. In rural 
areas, thank to rural electrification projects, the number of households being electrified has been 
risen from 51 percent to 96.8 percent between 1996 and 201226.  Besides, tele-density – the 
                                                             
24 The statistics are collected from World Bank (2008a). 
25 According to World Bank (2008a), some analysts have found even higher growth rate of road traffic in the 
Northern Red River Delta and the Southern Mekong Delta, reaching to about 29 percent per annum.  
26 Source: (World Bank, 2006), (MPI, 2013). 
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number of fixed and mobile line per 100 people – increased from 1.08 in 1995 to around 20 in 
2005 and has been observed an extensive improvement during 2010s.  
The developmental impact of these improving trends is apparent, both directly and indirectly. In 
particular, infrastructure improvement supports economic growth and poverty reduction through 
three channels. First, it helps to enhance economic activities by providing better linkages and 
access to markets, reducing production and transaction costs, increasing private investment, and 
raising agriculture and industrial productivity. Second, it assists to remove the bottlenecks in the 
economy which hinder people, especially those who live in rural and remote areas, from 
approaching to better conditions to gain higher productivity and asset accumulation. The 
elimination of these bottlenecks benefits the country‘s development by creating more 
employment and income opportunities and supplying better services for its citizens. Third, it 
guarantees the re-distributional effects on economic growth and poverty reduction, in which poor 
people have been offered more opportunities to access public services and to participate in the 
growth process by increasing their engagement in factors and product markets and reducing risk 
and vulnerability (OECD, 2007). 
Understanding the fact that economic infrastructure development is the catalyst for economic 
progress, Vietnamese government particularly prioritizes investment in this sector. In fact, 
Vietnam is among the world‘s leaders in infrastructure investment, with annual expenditure 
reaching an equivalent of 9-10 percent of GDP, nearly half of which is allocated in transportation 
sector27
.
 Moreover, high proportion of state investment is directed to economic infrastructure 
sector; for example, the ratio for the period 1997-2002 accounts for 44 percent of state 
investment (source: GSO). This strategy has accordingly led to positive impacts on spurring 
economic growth. The linkage between infrastructure development and growth and poverty 
reduction has been affirmed in both micro- and macro-economic studies. A review conducted by 
Vietnamese government and international donors in preparing for the Comprehensive Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) confirms that large-scale infrastructure plays a critical 
role in opening up new business opportunities, promoting income diversification and off-farm 
employment, and achieving poverty reduction in Vietnam (World Bank, 2006). Besides, Larsen 
et al. (2004) find credible evidence to prove the positive correlation between infrastructure 
                                                             
27 World Bank (2006) finds that Vietnam‘s infrastructure investment is high relative to other regional countries. 
Concretely, in 2003, the infrastructure investment rate of Cambodia, Indonesia, Philippines, Lao PDR, and China 
are 2.3, 2.7, 3.6, 4.7, 7.3 percent of GDP, respectively, while the rate of Vietnam is 9.9 percent. As a result, the rate 
of Vietnam is higher than many other countries in the world because East Asian countries have high investment rate 
compared to the rest of the world (World Bank, 2006). 
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investment and Vietnam‘s poverty reduction, in which investment in transport and water and 
sanitation have a particularly large local impact. For example, they observe that one additional 
percentage point of the provincial GDP to infrastructure leads to a reduction of the poverty rate 
by from 0.47 to 0.53 percent.  
Despite Vietnam‘s success in provision of infrastructure services over the past two decades, the 
country is now facing with two major challenges. Firstly, the infrastructure network is still 
incomplete and of low quality, meaning that infrastructure spending and attainments are far 
below what is needed. The World Economic Forum‘s Global Competitiveness Report (2011) 
expresses particular concerns about Vietnam‘s low quality of roads (120th/144), port 
infrastructure (113
th
/144), and electricity (113
th
/144). Comparing to other regional countries, 
Vietnam‘s infrastructure condition is much less competitive, which certainly hampers its 
investment opportunities and economic development (see figure 5.1 for more details). Indeed, a 
survey conducted in 2009 reveals that nearly 88 percent of foreign enterprises and 83 percent of 
domestic enterprises describe Vietnam‘s infrastructure as either ‗bad‘ or ‗very bad‘ and that poor 
infrastructure is cited as the largest bottleneck for conducting business in Vietnam. Worse still, 
poor economic infrastructure makes Vietnam suffer relatively large extra expenses. For example, 
the lack of world-class port infrastructure costs Vietnam an extra US$1.7 billion in logistics 
expenses annually as local companies transship goods via ports in Hong Kong and Singapore
28
.  
Figure 5. 1 Quality indices of infrastructure in selected Asian countries 
 
Source: 2011 Global Competitiveness Report 
                                                             
28 Media source:  http://english.thesaigontimes.vn/1201/Lack-of-port-logistics-causes-annual-loss-of-US$17-
billion.html 
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Secondly, Vietnam‘s rapid economic growth continues to create new demands for economic 
infrastructure, which consequently may burden the limited budget for expanding and maintaining 
infrastructure network and further worsen bottlenecks in business activities. In road sectors, for 
example, the rapid growth of transport services can be reflected in the drastic increase in 
transport activities and passengers and goods services. World Bank (2008a) indicates that over 
the period 1995-2006, the number of registered vehicles grew from about 4 millions to almost 20 
millions. Nevertheless, in 2004, only four percent of the network has four or more lanes. Worse 
still, capacity constraints are beginning to emerge in the network, particularly in big cities such 
as Hanoi and HCMC. As a consequence, it seems to be extremely hard for Vietnam with its tight 
budget to satisfy those continuously surging demands. According to the statistics revealed by 
World Bank, in 2009, insufficiency in financing the needed infrastructure investment, which 
amounts to about 9-10 percent of Vietnam‘s GDP, reaches to US$ 9 billion.  
With respect to the improvements and ongoing challenges discussed above, the considerable 
influence of external assistance over Vietnam‘s economic infrastructure sector is evident. Data 
collected by Larsen et al. (2004) shows that during the period 1996-2000, donors‘ financing 
accounts for approximately 72 percent of the public investment in infrastructure sector. To date, 
support from donors continues to play a significant role. In the field of transport and 
telecommunications, total ODA signed over the past time has reached US$16.47 billion and 
increased over time (see figure 5.2). Specially, transportation sector has been taken priority in 
receiving ODA and achieved impressive results. Over the past two decades, ODA has supported 
Vietnam to rehabilitate and develop important transportation projects, contributing to overall 
national and local economic growth
29
. Better still, advanced technologies and construction 
management experience have been transferred to the Vietnam side through ODA-funded 
projects, which eventually enhance Vietnam‘s capacity for transportation construction. MPI 
(2013) affirms that Vietnam‘s transportation construction personnel are now capable of 
undertaking large-scale and complicated transportation projects which require advanced 
techniques and management skills such as Vinh Tuy Bridge in Hanoi and Rach Mieu Bridge in 
Ben Tre.  
  
                                                             
29 According to the statistics revealed by MPI, over the period 1990-2015, the transportation sector has completed 
and is implementing 132 ODA-funded projects with a total value of more than US$17 billion. Project categories 
consist of national arterial highways projects, bridge construction projects, and deep seaports expanding projects 
(MPI, 2013). 
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Figure 5. 2 ODA support to transportation, post, and telecommunication (US$ millions) 
 
Note: Totally, there are 22 donors, including 18 bilateral donors, 4 multilateral  
donors. Some major donors: ADB, World Bank, Japan, France. 
Source: Foreign Economic Relation Department – MPI 
Besides transportation sector, external aid also encourages the development of energy and water 
and sanitation in Vietnam. In energy sector, total aid signed during the period 1993-2013 mounts 
to about US$10 billion, allocating to more than 70 electricity programmes and projects and 20 
technical assistance projects
30
. ODA projects mainly aim at enhancing power production and 
transmission, strengthening distribution capacity, and improving service quality in rural areas. 
Accordingly, foreign assistance has been considered as a supportive factor that assists Vietnam 
to cope with the growth in power demand at the rate of roughly 15-17 percent annually (MPI, 
2013). In addition, external assistance performs an extensive role in water and sanitation 
improvement in Vietnam by financing nearly 85 percent of total expenditure for this sector. 
Foreign aid, for instance, has supported the construction of such large-scale irrigation systems as 
Phan Ri - Phan Thiet irrigation system, and Phuoc Hoa irrigation system, assisting to regulate 
water for irrigation and flood control and prevention (MPI, 2013). 
In overall, the analysis assures the positive effect of external aid on growth through financing 
much-needed economic infrastructure system in Vietnam. The growth accounting result that 
highlights the contribution of capital to economic growth further supports this conclusion. One 
issue ensued from the analysis is that whilst foreign aid appears an enormously important source 
of economic infrastructure investment, quite a few existing studies express the concern about the 
possibly downward trend of ODA inflow in the future and call for other financing resources, 
                                                             
30 Some examples of large power plants using ODA funding are Phu My Power plant 2.1 (288 MW), Pha Lai 
Thermal Power Plant 2 (600 MW), Ham Thuan - Da Mi Hydropower Plant (475 MW), Phu My Thermal Power 
Plant 1 (1090 MW), O-Mon Thermal Power Plant (600 MW), and Dai Ninh Hydropower Plant (360 MW) (source: 
MPI). 
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especially the private sector funding (see more World Bank, 2006). However, this issue will not 
be discussed here as it is out of the scope of this paper. 
5.3 Aid and social infrastructure  
Social infrastructure, in general, and education and health sector, in particular, have always been 
important recipients of global attention and external assistance. Foreign aid inflow to Vietnam 
also exhibits this tendency. Indeed, ODA allocated to education and health sectors has increased 
over time and amounted to approximately 9 percent of total aid value over the period 1993-2012. 
It might be far from easy to accurately quantify the impact of foreign aid on final education and 
health outcomes since they are influenced by multifaceted contributory factors including social, 
political, and economic contexts, but only some of which are aid-related. Nevertheless, there can 
be little doubt that external assistance positively impacts on overall education and health service 
provision through its contribution to government expenditure on health and education and 
funding to off-budget projects and programmes directing to these two sectors. This sub-chapter 
will review the progress as well as challenges of Vietnam‘s education and health sectors and then 
point out the linkage between aid and the final outcomes of those two sectors. 
Over the past 20 years, Vietnam has obtained impressive improvements in terms of education 
and health care provision services (see table 5.3 and 5.4 to get some main indicators). In general, 
these achievements are determined by the expansion and equity of the services to the targeted 
population and the improvement in quality of the services available. In the education sector, 
there has been a substantial increase in gross enrollment rate of secondary and tertiary education, 
in which the former has risen from 57 percent in 1998-1999 to 92 percent in 2012 and the latter 
has increased to 72 percent in 2012 from 9.5 percent in 1998-1999 (see table 5.3). This 
recognizes the accomplishments in increasing demand for and rapid expansion of higher 
education in Vietnam. Since there is no information on changes in education quality, student-
teacher ratio and repeater rate have been taken into account to indirectly examine the progress in 
quality. As table 5.3 shows, these two ratios have been witnessed to decrease between 1998 and 
2012, partially illustrating the improvement in quality of educational service provision. 
Moreover, gender inequality in education, especially in higher education, has gradually reduced 
over time. More explicitly, while the overall share of females in the population has been fairly 
stable, the ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment has raised from 66 percent in 1998-1999 to 
around 101 percent in 2011. 
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Table 5. 3 Summary of education indicators 
 
1989/1990 1998/1999 2011/2012 
Schooling Enrollment rate - Primary (% gross) 103.4 112.5 104.7 
Schooling Enrollment rate – secondary (% gross) 34.4 57.2 92 
Schooling Enrollment rate – Tertiary (% gross) 2.7 9.5 71.9 
Literate rate Adult total (%) 87.6 90 93.4 
Student : teacher ratio - Primary 34.2 32.1 19.4 
Student : teacher ratio - Secondary 17.98 28.9 17.4 
Repeater primary (%) 
 
3.8 1.3 
Repeater secondary (%) 
 
1.9 1.5 
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%) 
 
95.0 95.9 
Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%) 
 
66.2 101.6 
Source: World Bank, GSO 
Table 5. 4 Summary of health indicators 
  1990 1993 1995 2000 2010 
Life expectancy 66 68 
 
70 73 
Infant mortality (%) 4.44 
  
2.9 1.58 
Malnutrition prevalence, height for age (% of 
children under 5) 
 
61.4 
 
43.4 23.3 
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of 
children under 5) 
 
36.9 
 
26.7 12 
Number of health centers 
  
12,972 13,117 13,467 
Number of beds provided by health service 
  
192,300 192,500 246,300 
Number of officials working in health sector 
  
30,600 39,200 61,400 
Source: World Bank, GSO 
In the health system, the final outcomes are judged according to how well health care service 
provision improves the health of individuals and populations. Some indicators that can be used to 
examine population health include infant mortality, life expectancy, and malnutrition prevalence 
ratio. Over the last 20 years, Vietnam has achieved considerable progress in health – as measured 
by expanded life expectancy indicator and reduced infant mortality and malnutrition prevalence 
ratio indicators (see table 5.4). Moreover, health care service provision continues to expand with 
increasing number of health centers and number of beds provided by health service. For 
example, the number of beds increased by 54,000 beds between 1995 and 2010. As with 
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education services, there are little reliable data on quality of health care service in Vietnam. 
However, the fact that the number of health workers has doubled from 1995 to 2010 might be 
expected to lower the health worker-patient rate and then improve service quality (see table 5.4).  
At an aggregate level, the outcome of remarkably expanded service provision and slightly 
improved service quality in health and education sectors can be associated with increased 
spending on these two sectors since 1990s. During 1995-2011, Vietnam‘s total expenditure on 
education is relatively stable as a percentage of GDP, which is roughly equivalent to 3 percent. 
Regarding health sector, the average spending accounts to about 5.7 percent of GDP, in which 
the total health expenditure was quite steady between 1995 and 2005 and then tends to be 
slightly increased since 2006 (source: World Bank). In terms of total expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, Vietnam is considered comparing poorly in education sector but fairly well in health 
sector to the rest of its region and to the rest of the world
31
. However, in general, the absolute 
term in spending on social service provision has considerably increased as Vietnam has been 
recorded rapid economic growth since 1990s. Looking into the social service financing 
composition, there is a common feature in both education and health sector that off-budget 
funding accounts for a large share while public expenditure covers only one-quarter of total 
spending. Nevertheless, public spending on education and health has significantly heightened 
(see figure 5.3) and mainly focused on vital necessities and equality of service provision. For 
instance, in education, state budget is used to build infrastructure, cover teacher-training 
activities, and renovate curriculum and textbooks (World Bank, 2008b). In health sector, 
government spending is mainly used to cover social health insurance (SHI) and to exempt the 
poor from paying user fees with the aim of improving accessibility to health care services for the 
poor and other vulnerable population groups (Tran Van Tien et al., 2011).  
  
                                                             
31 World Bank (2008b) claims that Vietnam‘s education expenditure as percentage of GDP is below the expenditure 
level of other 162 countries all over the world whose the average level reaches to 4.7 percent. However, in health 
sector, Vietnam‘s total health expenditure share of GDP is assessed to be higher than other countries of similar or 
higher income in the region such as Laos, Cambodia, Philippines, Thai Land, Indonesia, and China (see Tran Van 
Tien et al., 2011). 
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Figure 5. 3 Public spending on education and health (VND billions) 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
As discussed above, foreign aid positively supports social service provision through both state 
budget financing and off-budget projects. Persuasively, the magnitude of expansion of education 
and health spending would not have been possible without external financial support. Since 
1993, committed ODA for social infrastructure has sharply risen, in which total ODA mobilized 
in the area of education and health in the period 1993-2012 reaches to US$2.44 billion (US$1.79 
billion of loans and US$653 million of grants) and US$2.352 billion (US$1.254 billion of loans 
and US$1.098 billion of grants), respectively (Source: MPI). It is worthy to note that aid inflow 
to education and training sector in Vietnam strongly encourages equality in service delivery. 
MPI (2013) observes that almost all ODA programs and projects (except for higher education 
development projects) are designed to support education development in remote and ethnic 
minority areas, which eventually improve educational accessibility for the disadvantages. MPI 
also reports that the ODA allocated to the health sector over the past time has significantly 
contributed to improved health care services for the people in Vietnam and the progress recorded 
in the implementation of health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
Notwithstanding aforementioned achievements, the Vietnamese education and health care 
system have still suffered from a number of drawbacks and mismatches. The biggest challenge 
faced by Vietnamese education system is low educational quality and efficiency, especially in 
vocational and higher education. This concern has become more severe when addressing the 
significant role of higher education graduates in increasing productivity and country‘s total 
output.  World Bank (2008b) proves that a one percentage point increase in the share of tertiary 
graduates would already lead to an increase of about 0.9 percent in labor productivity in 
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Vietnam. Additionally, growth accounting analysis which was conducted in the chapter 3 also 
indicates that higher education and vocational training result to higher level of productivity 
weight. The weakness seems to be attributed to the contradiction between the goals of service 
expansion and quality improvement and the limited resources in terms of both financial and 
human resources. Given today‘s requirement for the development of a knowledge-based 
economy, both Vietnamese leaders and people are not satisfied with the current education system 
and call for stronger reforms. The curriculum is usually criticized since it is supply- rather than 
demand-driven, theoretical rather than practical, and lacking in necessary skills needed for good 
performance in the workplace. This skill gap has created the ongoing paradox that while 
unemployed graduates are considerably increased, quite a few job vacancies cannot be filled up 
due to the fact that candidates do not meet the basic requirements of these positions (World 
Bank, 2008b).  
The second challenge in Vietnam‘s education system is to create an equity-based system that is 
accessible to a large percentage of the population. Although over the past 20 years, the gaps in 
access to education among different ethnic groups and genders have been narrowed, there is 
evidence that female, minority ethnic groups, poor people, and those from remote regions are not 
represented in higher education proportionately to their numbers in the population (World Bank, 
2008b). Furthermore, Nguyen Quang Kinh and Nguyen Quoc Chi (2008) argue that the 
proportion of ethnic minority students in upper secondary schools (9.4 percent) and higher 
education institutions (4 percent) are relatively low and need improvement.  
As with education sector, health sector in Vietnam is also confronting with worrying tendency in 
terms of inequality and low quality of service delivery. Firstly, despite substantial achievements 
in expanding health care service, there are still large health status disparities cross regions and 
between demographic and socioeconomic groups. There has been evidence to indicate 
inequalities in child mortality between the poor and the better off people. Lieberman and 
Wagstaff (2009), for example, show that Vietnam‘s richer south and Red River Delta regions 
have reduced infant mortality faster than the poorer central and northern regions of the country. 
They also find the inequalities in childhood immunization coverage, in which the poorest fifth of 
the population saw the smallest enhancement while the richest fifth undertook dramatic increase 
in the fraction of children fully immunized. Moreover, Vietnam‘s government health spending 
mainly targets to urban hospitals (about 80 percent), leading to disproportionate benefits to the 
economically better off population.  
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Secondly, low quality of service delivery and inefficiency in health investment are main 
concerns of Vietnamese government and donor community. The World Health Report 2010 
considers that countries with high level of pooled funds - around 5-6 percent of GDP - have often 
accomplished ―universal access to health care for the entire population‖. However, Vietnam‘s 
health care service of which pooled funds account for 5.7 percent of GDP is far below 
international standards and has recently performed poorly after achieving notable improvements 
during 1990s (Lieberman and Wagstaff, 2009). One manifestation of relatively low quality of 
health service is the severe overcrowding situation at public hospitals in big cities. For instance, 
bed capacity in Cho Ray Hospital in HCMC reached 135 per cent in 2013; or at the HCMC 
Oncology Hospital, there were 560 inpatients per 160 beds
32
. This situation might be largely due 
to the lack of human resources, the inefficiency in health investment, and less concern of the 
government for developing private hospitals and health centers at small cities and rural areas. 
Moreover, corruption has been claimed to be a major threat to health system performance and 
health outcomes in Vietnam (Taryn Vian et al., 2012). A recent national survey shows that 65% 
of respondents experienced corruption at local health services, which certainly limits the access 
to healthcare services for people, especially the poor, and deteriorates service quality. 
In summary, evidence discussed here demonstrates the positive impact of external aid on social 
service provision and, therefore, on economic growth. This relationship has been partially 
manifested in the growth accounting results, which explain the strong contribution of education 
to national economic outcome. Since 1990s, Vietnam has done fairly well in providing its 
citizens with basic education and health care services. Nevertheless, quality and equality of 
service delivery have still been serious challenges for Vietnamese government and international 
donors. Obviously, quantitative expansion alone is not enough to obtain long-term economic 
growth and sustainable development. Thus, the government, in cooperation with international 
community, should put more effort into tackling the problem of low quality and inequality of 
social service provision in Vietnam.  
  
                                                             
32 Source: http://vietnamnews.vn/society/252295/public-private-co-operation-to-ease-overcrowding-in-
hospitals.html 
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6 NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF AID 
6.1 Macroeconomic consequences 
It has been widely agreed among recipients and donor community that while scaling aid can 
support economic growth and poverty reduction in low-income countries, it might lead to some 
adverse macroeconomic consequences. For the purpose of examining the possible 
macroeconomic challenges risen from increasing external assistance for the case of Vietnam, this 
section will discuss two main issues, namely Dutch disease and the volatility and 
unpredictability of foreign aid.  
The existence of Dutch disease has been seen as a potentially damaging effect of increasing 
capital inflows. The fundamental concept of Dutch disease is that the growth in capital inflows 
could induce the appreciation of the domestic currency and then reduce the competitiveness of 
export as seen in Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas giving the phenomenon its name. 
More particularly, capital inflow such as aid will increase the demand for both tradable and non-
tradable goods. Due to the fact that non-tradable goods and services are in short supply since 
they are produced and consumed domestically, the increase in demand of these goods drives up 
their price relative to the tradable ones and shifts resources out of traded goods sectors. This 
results in a real exchange rate appreciation. The channel through which aid-induced Dutch 
disease could hurt the recipients‘ development is that it squeezes the profit of exporting 
industries and private sector and therefore the international competitiveness of the country. Isard, 
P., et al. (2006) note that the Dutch disease effects depend on how aid is used. If aid boosts the 
productivity favoring non-tradable sector, it could offset the appreciation of the exchange rate 
and mitigate the Dutch disease consequences. Besides, if aid-induced spending enhances the 
productivity of private factors of productions, it can increase the long-term welfare and growth in 
the export sector of the economy (Isard, P. et al., 2006).  
In the context of Vietnam, it is far from easy to differentiate the exchange rate impact of foreign 
aid from other factors such as monetary and fiscal policies. However, this section would analyze 
the exchange rate regime and real effective exchange rate (REER) trend in Vietnam to point out 
potential signal of Dutch disease and then try to link it to the aid impact. The approximation of 
the real exchange rate during the period 1992-2008 is taken from Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N. 
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(2009) and Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N. (2010)
33
 (see figure 6.1). The real effective exchange 
rate indices are defined in foreign currency terms and estimated following the formula: 
REERt =  𝑒𝑗𝑡  
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑗𝑡
 
𝑊𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1  
where n is the number of trading partners, ejt is the nominal exchange rate relative to currency j; 
Wjt is the weight assigned to currency j at time t; Pt is domestic price index at time t; and Pjt is 
the price index of foreign country j at time t. 
A real exchange rate appreciation can take place through either domestic inflation or nominal 
exchange rate appreciation which depends on the exchange rate regime. In countries with 
floating exchange rate, the central bank sells the foreign exchange associated with aid leading 
appreciation in nominal exchange rate and then real exchange rate. In countries with fixed or 
preannounced nominal exchange rate, the real appreciation occurs through domestic inflation. 
With respect to the case of Vietnam, the country officially maintains a managed floating 
exchange rate regime, but the VND has usually been pegged de factor to the USD (IMF, 2007). 
The basic feature of the current exchange rate regime is the announcement of official exchange 
rate with a band of allowable exchange rate quotations by the Central Bank of Vietnam (SBV). 
Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N. (2010) claim that the process of announcing the official exchange 
rate has not been transparent and appeared to reflect the will of the SBV. The fact that the SBV 
aims to control short-term changes in the exchange rate has made the nominal exchange rate tend 
to be sticky or even rigid. Additionally, during the period under consideration, the VND was 
usually under the pressure to depreciate due to the persistent excess demand of USD from the 
economy (Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N., 2010). For these reasons, it would seem that most of 
real exchange rate appreciation in Vietnam has occurred through spiraling inflation (Menon, 
2009). 
  
                                                             
33 This study does not use the Vietnam‘s nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and real effective exchange rate 
(REER)  that have been calculated in IMF‘s publications as those data relate to relative short time and to different 
base years. Besides, Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N. (2009) have conducted a meticulous estimation which makes use 
of a basket comprising 25 country partners accounting for about 90 percent of Vietnam‘s total trade. Moreover, 
Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N. (2009) confirm that their methods of compiling the data are very similar to the IMF 
methods which is reflected by the fact that the two series comply very well at overlapping periods. 
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Figure 6. 1 USD/VND index, NEER, REER, and export volume (1992-2008) 
 
Note: As both indices are defined in foreign-currency terms, an increase in their value indicates an appreciation of 
the home currency. 
Source: Export volume: GSO 
REER, NEER, USD/VND: (Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N., 2009) and (Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N., 2010) 
The analysis of Vietnam‘s REER trend reveals that during much of the period under study, 
capital inflows have not induced exporting contraction (see figure 6.1). There is an exception 
during 2007-2008 when the signal of Dutch disease‘s existence can be witnessed for a short time 
but the impact of aid on this trend appears to be modest. As can be seen from figure 6.1, the 
USD/VND was kept relatively stable with the exception of during Asian Financial Crisis and its 
aftermath when there was a major weakening of VND against the USD. During the same time, 
REER was appreciated two times including a slight increase during 1997-1998 and a rapid 
increase during 2007-2008, both of which associate with spiraling inflation
34
. While the 
appreciation of REER occurring in 1997-1998 did not arouse concern about Dutch disease‘s 
existence, the sharp increase of REER in late-2007 and early-2008 causes worry about losing 
competitiveness
35
 (see more Phuc, N. T. and Duc-Tho, N., 2010; IMF, 2009). IMF (2009) 
observes that the remaining upward trend of inflation and the more rapid appreciation of real 
                                                             
34
 In 1998, the inflation rate was 7.3 percent, increasing by 126 percent compared to the previous year. In 2008, the 
inflation rate reached the peak of 23.1 percent from 8.3 percent in 2007 (source: IMF database). 
35 In 2008, the annual growth of export was only 5 percent, which is the lowest export growth rate in Vietnam during 
the period 1993-2012. 
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exchange rate could then lead to losses in competitiveness, threaten external sustainability, and 
undermine investor confidence. A closer examination of this sub-period indicates that the reason 
of this appreciation of the dong is the surge in capital inflows which mainly stems from the 
massive growth in FDI. More explicitly, the growth rates of implemented FDI reached 96 
percent and 43 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively, which has been seen as a remarkable 
upturn when comparing to the average growth rate of nearly 20 percent during previous years. At 
the same time, the growth of ODA inflow was much smaller, which accounts for 21 percent and 
3.5 percent in 2007 and 2008, respectively. Although it is not possible to prove conclusively that 
whether or not aid inflows cause such Dutch disease‘s symptom in Vietnam in the absence of 
further and complicated examination, the evidence is relatively suggestive that aid impact on real 
exchange rate, if there is the case, seems to be negligible.  
In fact, the real exchange rate appreciation occurring since 2007 only lasted for short period of 
time. Because of the SBV‘s intervention and sudden downward trend of capital inflows, the 
REER depreciated in December 2008 (IMF, 2010). After that, the REER appreciated about 11 
percent since March 2011, largely reflecting high inflation rate. However, unlike what happened 
in 2008, the galloping inflation in 2011 is mainly due to the wake of a large macroeconomic 
policy stimulus in response to the global financial crisis (IMF, 2012). 
The second macroeconomic challenge of scaling aid that might pose major problems for budget 
management and macroeconomic stabilization in recipient country is the volatility and 
unpredictability of aid inflows. The reason for aid volatility might be associated with donor 
behavior such as donor conditionality or prerogatives as well as recipient country behavior such 
as domestic political turmoil, policy performance, or corruption level (UNDP, 2011, p. 165). In 
general, aid volatility and unpredictability can cause harm in three ways. First, unanticipated 
decline in aid forces the recipient government to scale down, postpone, or abandon those 
spending categories that are easy to adjust such as repairs, maintenance, or investment (Isard, P. 
et al., 2006). In a direct sense, postponing of planned expenditure is costly and harmful to the 
composition of investment since the government has to shift spending away from growth-
enhancing long-term investment (UNDP, 2011, p. 164). Additionally, aid volatility can weaken 
the general discipline of government operations when unexpected drop in external aid makes the 
recipient fail to meet its targets (Isard, P. et al., 2006). Second, unpredictable decrease of aid 
might confront the government with another unattractive alternative that is to finance necessary 
spending through money creation or debt issuance. Aid volatility, by this way, can lead to 
volatility in inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates and thereby worsen the macroeconomic 
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stability (Isard, P. et al., 2006). Finally, in addition to pose challenges for short-term fiscal 
management, aid volatility and unpredictability also hinder the policymakers from building up an 
efficient plan to maximize the effectiveness of aid in long-term. Consequently, external 
assistance might not contribute as much to the recipient‘s economic growth and development as 
it is expected.  
Figure 6. 2 Aid disbursement rate, aid inflow growth rate, and revenue growth rate (%) 
 
Source: MPI, MoF 
With respect to the Vietnam case, aid volatility and unpredictability appear to happen in 
relatively large magnitude and cause harm to fiscal management. The figure 6.2 captures the 
trend of the ratio of committed aid to disbursed aid, aid inflow growth rate, and revenue growth 
rate with the purpose of providing the measurement of Vietnam‘s aid volatility and 
unpredictability. As figure 6.2 shows, the aid disbursement ratio and aid inflow growth rate in 
Vietnam have not followed a predictable trend, illustrating the high volatility of foreign aid 
during the period 1993-2012. Furthermore, comparing to domestic revenue, the magnitude of aid 
volatility comes out to be much higher. Although there has been limited information regarding 
how much aid volatility impacts on fiscal management in Vietnam, under the circumstance that 
aid contribution has accounted for 17 percent of total government investment, aid volatility and 
unpredictability would certainly confront the Vietnamese government with the difficulty in 
maintaining fiscal discipline.  
To summarize, the analysis seems to indicate that macroeconomic challenges of scaling aid in 
Vietnam have not been stemmed from Dutch disease effect but from aid volatility and 
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unpredictability. The uncertainty in aid volume can cause the mismatches between government 
receipt and planned expenditure. The problem is that with constraint financial resources and 
limited management capacity, Vietnam might find it difficult to control those mismatches, which 
can be problematic in the longer run. 
6.2 Absorptive capacity 
One common concern of both donor community and recipient government is absorptive capacity, 
which refers to the capacity to use aid efficiently for developmental purposes. It is based on the 
recognition that aid may yield developmental benefits for recipient country but large amount aid 
is not necessarily associated with bigger and better impacts. There are several factors that 
contribute to the absorptive capacity constraints in recipient country. First, poor institutional and 
administrative capacity undermines the efficiency in implementing and using foreign assistance. 
Indeed, Hyewon Kang (2010) claims that the existence of an effective system for ODA 
administration, including ODA-related policies and programming guidelines would be critically 
important. Second, technical and managerial constraints appear to be major challenge to 
developing countries in an effort to improve aid absorption. A case in point, the lack of human 
resources with the right skills at the technical and managerial level might hinder the efficiency of 
ODA programme and project management or obstruct the coordination between donor and 
recipient. Finally, absorptive capacity constraint can be attributed to the absent or inadequate 
coordination among involved parties. The mismatches here can be occurred between donors and 
recipient‘s authorities at different levels or among donors. The gap between donors‘ and 
recipient‘s priorities regarding the target of ODA programmes and projects or the lack of 
coordination at sectoral level to which aid will be allocated are the reasons for the ineffectiveness 
of aid absorption. In addition, the fact of a large group of donors with inconsistent country 
assistance strategies may result in conflict in aid conditionality, duplication in aid allocation, or 
competition among donors for skilled personnel and other scarce human resources, and then lead 
to inefficient allocations or bottlenecks.  
In general, absorptive capacity constraints inflict harms to the recipient country through two 
channels. First, it diminishes aid effectiveness by driving up the transaction costs and causing a 
waste of human and financial capital of both donors and recipients without achieving acceptable 
returns. Second, it influences the volume of aid delivered by discouraging donors and 
governments from entering into agreements and reducing disbursement rates. As discussed 
above, large and increasing amount of aid may further intensify the pressures on limited 
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resources in developing countries. In contrast, foreign aid can relax absorptive capacity 
constraints through technical assistances and financial supports, especially those targeting to 
administrative and managerial improvement in recipient country. Therefore, the key challenge is 
to find ways in which aid can be used to relax the constraints while simultaneously avoiding 
exhausting the existing resources. One suggestion is that before additional aid is poured into 
priority sectors, judgments are needed to point out if there is any problem with the existing 
resources. Then, the potential problems must be diagnosed and solved or else the aid allocation 
plan should be adjusted (Isard, P. et al., 2006). 
Absorptive capacity constraints have been considered as one of the most serious limitations that 
undermine ODA management and utilization in Vietnam (MPI, 2013). The first and foremost 
problem refers to institutional and administrative capacity. It appears that ODA-related legal 
frameworks and guidelines are not consistent and clear enough. MPI reports that processes and 
procedures for ODA programmes and projects are complicated and inconsistent. Specifically, 
government decision-making requires multiple levels of approval but the division of roles and 
powers of different government institutions at different stages are not well understood, 
sometimes leading to the situation of ―double‖ submission for approval (see more Adrienne 
Brown et al., 2000; MPI, 2013). Another big impediment is land compensation and site clearance 
that are required in almost large-scale ODA-funded construction projects. Site clearance is often 
subjected to delay since the compensation rate is set at a much lower level than the market price, 
discouraging people from moving away (Hang, 2007). For these reasons, the preparation for 
implementation of ODA-funded projects often lasts long, ranging from two to three years, and 
requires the adjustment in total investment due to changes in price and cost of clearance. 
Another aid absorptive capacity constraint in Vietnam includes low professional qualification of 
the project staff, especially at local level. In fact, the staff usually takes project management on 
part-time and has not been trained properly (MPI, 2013). Furthermore, the lack of experience in 
project activities and English proficiency of many project officials are also another large 
problem. JICA and CIEM (2003) claim that those limitations inhibit Vietnamese side from 
effectively discussing and negotiating project-related issues with foreign consultants and donors. 
As a consequence, the recipient tends to be more passive, resulting in a donor-driven project 
formulation and designing (JICA and CIEM, 2003). 
Last but not least, coordination among involved parties does greatly matter to aid absorptive 
capacity in Vietnam. As reported by MPI, coordination among ministries and sectors, between 
63 
 
central and local levels, and with the donors has not been really smooth. In fact, some ODA 
programmes and projects have not been designed for being suitable to the actual context of 
Vietnam, in general, or of the localities, in particular. In some cases, various sources of funding 
are poured into the same sector at the same locality, leading to inefficiency in aid allocation and 
waste of both locals‘ and donors‘ resources (MPI, 2013). Moreover, a large group of donors 
leads to diversity in donor procedures and then diminishes aid harmonization. Hang (2007) finds 
that in 2005, the disbursement rate of bilateral donors was double that of multilateral donors, 
indicating that multilateral donors have more complicated procedures than bilateral ones. This is 
not for arguing that it would be better when working with bilateral donors but that a common 
country assistance strategy among donors would be crucially important for a recipient assisted by 
quite a few donors like Vietnam.  
The increasing trend to move toward non-project based and country system used modalities 
including general or sector budgetary support and pooled funding in Vietnam recently can be 
seen as the movement of recipient government and donors to mitigate the problem of 
misalignment between two sides‘ priorities. It is acknowledged that these instruments have been 
helpful and should be adopted. First, direct budget support modality has aligned the ODA with 
government‘s own development priorities and increase government ownership, which pave the 
way to support sustainability and independence from donors (Adam McCarty et al., 2009). 
Second, it may lead to the reduction of some costs and thereby make more funds available for 
other activities. Indeed, Hang (2007) observes that the shift toward budget support modality 
would greatly lower the administrative costs of donors. Furthermore, through international 
competitive bidding, the recipient country can select the tender with the lowest possible cost and 
highest quality instead of being limited to those tenders favored by donors. For example, 
Japanese ODA-funded projects have been shown to be relatively expensive since the donor 
tightly controls bidding terms and procedures which clearly favor Japanese firms to win the 
contracts (Do, 2007). Third, the Vietnam side might pay more attention to and effort into 
capacity building, particularly with regards to procurement and financial management when it 
has to take on full responsibility for implementing the projects.  
Although budget support modality offers potential advantages, some concerns regarding its 
negative impacts should be taken into account. The first constraint is that because of the 
complexity and large-scale of ODA project and programme, the recipient authority does not have 
adequate management capacity to maintain effective operation. Adam McCarty et al. (2009), for 
instance, point out that limited capacity of the government such as the lack of experience in 
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management has hindered Vietnam from holding a successful international competitive bidding. 
Furthermore, budget support modality without the supervision from donors may lead to the 
misuse of aid such as fungibility or corruption. It can be seen that the recent changes in funding 
modality does not guarantee the improvement in aid outcomes and might even cause adverse 
impacts; and thus it should not be viewed as panacea. 
In sum, the analysis shows that Vietnam has been facing with major absorptive capacity 
constraints that impair the aid effectiveness. It is considered as the main cause of the relatively 
low rate of aid disbursement in Vietnam over the past 20 years (MPI, 2013). It should be noted 
that foreign aid is not ―free gift‖ and that interest rates and loan fees would increase if 
disbursement is delayed and the use of loans is ineffective. Consequently, this would certainly 
place heavy burden on future generations and impede the long-run development of the country.  
6.3 Aid and governance 
Theory is ambiguous with respect to aid impact on the quality of governance. On the one hand, 
aid could be associated with improved governance through programmes and projects to 
strengthen the legal system, public financial management, anti-corruption, or other aspects of 
governance. On the other hand, foreign aid could adversely affect institutional and governance 
quality of the recipient countries (see Knack, 2001; Brautigam and Knack, 2004). Thus, a case-
study approach is needed to examine more closely the correlation between foreign assistance and 
quality of governance. With respect of Vietnam case, increasing inflow of aid might have 
significant effects on governance, both for worse and for better. The previous chapter has already 
discussed the positive impacts of aid on institutions and governance. This sub-chapter would 
thus focus on potentially detrimental effects of aid on governance, in which corruption would be 
treated in greater details than other aspects of governance.  
There are two main channels through which high level of aid can weaken the quality of 
governance in recipient countries. First, external aid can undermine the recipient governments‘ 
domestic revenue effort. In some case, less incentive to invest in effective domestic tax 
collection might reduce the government‘s dependence on its citizens for tax revenue and weaken 
democratic accountability (Bevan, 2005). The recipient government, in this case, is accountable 
primarily to the donors rather than to tax payers (Knack, 2001). Second, large aid inflows could 
intensify rent seeking, undermining the quality of public sector and increasing the incidence of 
corruption (Isard, P. et al., 2006; Knack, 2001). Arguably, the fact that a large amount of funding 
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which is implemented under the existence of weak institutional governance and the lack of 
sanctions when aid fails to improve development performance, seems to facilitate the misuse of 
funds. Moreover, it is also the case that donors have been either complicit with public sector 
corruption (Channing Arndt et al., 2006) or unable to effectively monitor the use of their funding 
at various destinations, which eventually creates greater opportunities for moral hazard.  
The association between aid and governance seems strong but precise causal link between them 
is hard to indentify since governance may also be influenced by numerous other factors and we 
cannot discriminate the impacts of those factors from the impact of aid. However, it is the fact 
that a sheer volume of aid transferred in the context of poor institutional management would 
facilitate rent seeking. Therefore, a more feasible approach for the case of Vietnam is to examine 
the quality of governance and to recognize the existence of scandals over corruption in ODA-
related activities. Since the announcement of the Doi Moi, together with impressive socio-
economic development, the government has made great effort to improve quality of governance; 
yet the pace of government reforms has been patchy and uneven. While some improvements 
have been made through financial management reform, reduction in red tape, devolution of 
administrative powers to local levels, and enhanced law-making, such areas as accountability, 
transparency, standards of service delivery, and the quality of state officials remain of 
considerable concerns (Norad, 2011). Indeed, Vietnam‘s governance indicators regarding control 
of corruption, regulatory quality, rule of law, and accountability are at relatively low level and 
have not been improved (see figure 6.3). The Global Competitive Report 2013 also concludes 
that Vietnam‘s public institutions are characterized by rampant corruption and inefficiencies of 
all kinds. One Vietnamese government‘s report, for example, releases that bureaucrats 
misappropriated at least 20 percent of infrastructure spending (Norad, 2011).  
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Figure 6. 3 World governance ratings for Vietnam (best to worst: +2.5 to -2.5) 
 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators – the World Bank 
Widespread corruption in ODA-related projects and programmes has aroused deep concerns to 
both Vietnamese government and its donors. Big scandals that were uncovered over the last 
years illustrate the severity of this rampant problem. In 2006, many high-ranking officials, even 
including some ministers and deputy ministers, had to resign when the big scandal, Project 
Management Unit (PMU) 18, occurred. They were accused of embezzlement, nepotism, and 
bribery when managing funds for road constructions, including ODA funds from numerous 
donors to Vietnam for transport infrastructure development (Feasel, 2013). In 2008, the 
government of Japan had to suspend ODA to Vietnam for four months since a Japanese firm, 
which was hired as the project consultant, was found guilty of paying bribes to Vietnamese 
officials in charge of the Ho Chi Minh highway project. Most recently, in 2014, several officials 
at Vietnam Railways, the state-owned operator of the railway system in the country, were 
suspended for involving in allegation that a Japanese firm had paid bribes to secure a deal for a 
rail project in Hanoi. 
Another argument for unintended impacts of aid on governance can be based on the extent to 
which donors have attempted to mitigate the negative institutional dynamics associated with 
foreign aid. It is argued that the effort of donor agencies to enhance public financial management 
and anti-corruption illustrates their recognition of potential problems in these areas that can be 
exacerbated by external funding (Channing Arndt et al., 2006). The examination of donors‘ 
assistance strategy over the last two decades indicates that they have increasingly focused on 
governance reform, in general, and anti-corruption, in particular. Before 2006, donors‘ support 
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for governance reform was mainly emphasized on such fields as public administration and 
financial management, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law. Since 2006, the 
commencement of the anti-corruption law as well as the establishment of enhanced institutional 
arrangements have gradually shifted the donors‘ focus toward anti-corruption activities such as 
supporting anti-corruption legal and framework (Norad, 2011). For example, UK Department for 
International Development Vietnam‘s (DFIDV) 2007-11 Country Assistance Plan (CAP) has 
been designed with the aim of increasing effort against corruption and helping to set up an 
effective, new National Anti-Corruption Committee (Norad, 2011). Moreover, Norad (2011) 
notes that quite a few donors have given considerable attention in recent years to prevent their 
own ODA projects and programmes from corruption through tightening up programme 
management and audit arrangements. For instance, ADB has established a special unit to 
supervise its procurement work.  
In summary, the discussion reveals that large inflow of external aid might possibly cause 
institutional fragmentation and facilitate moral hazard problem in Vietnam. Weak management 
system has created opportunities for some involved people to take advantage of public loans and 
grants for personal enrichment. Therefore, the important lesson here is not to attract as much 
foreign aid as possible but to implement it effectively. Nguyen Duc Thanh, a Vietnamese 
economist who advises the prime minister on economic policies, has said: ―Vietnam should stop 
regarding ODA as an achievement in international relations so it can tread more carefully before 
deciding on asking for more international aid.‖ 
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7 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Results 
In most developing countries where savings gap, foreign exchange gap, and human capital gap 
have still existed, foreign aid is expected to narrow those gaps and subsequently boost economic 
growth. The debate over the aggregate impact of aid on growth in developing countries has been 
flourished over the past several decades. Vietnam appears to be a typical example of developing 
countries that have attained remarkable success in economic growth and poverty reduction since 
1990s. Simultaneously, foreign aid inflow to the country has been considerably increased and 
reached the international top levels of sheer size. On this basis, the present study attempts to 
estimate the influence of external assistance on economic development in Vietnam using growth 
accounting analysis and the ARDL bounds test approach for the period 1993-2012.  
Based on the ARDL model carried out in this paper, foreign aid is found to play a significantly 
positive role in promoting economic growth in Vietnam. The results of growth accounting 
exercise and the analysis of fundamental channels through which aid has contributed to 
development outcomes have also obtained more evidence supporting the beneficial impacts of 
aid on economic growth. In particular, the analysis reveals that external assistance has been 
instrumental in making Vietnam‘s impressive achievements in macroeconomic management and 
economic infrastructure possible. Besides, aid has been observed to substantially contribute to 
human capital accumulation in Vietnam since 1990s, particularly improved educational 
attainment and enhanced health.  
At the same time, aid however has not been without problems. Although Dutch disease effect has 
not been found in Vietnam during the period under consideration, the high volatility and 
unpredictability of aid inflow seem to pose macroeconomic challenges to Vietnam, especially 
fiscal imbalance. Moreover, under the current circumstances of relatively weak macroeconomic 
management and scarce human resources in Vietnam, scaling aid inflow is likely to impose 
absorptive capacity constraints which, in turn, undermine the aid effectiveness and lower the rate 
of aid disbursement. Vietnamese government and its donors accordingly direct the focus toward 
optimizing the use of the current inflow instead of trying to maximize the aid quantity. Another 
possibly adverse impact of aid refers to the rent seeking behavior. Because Vietnam has had a 
history of corruption in public institutions and poor institutional management, the 
misappropriations of external assistance have been proved not to be an exception. 
7.2 Discussion and policy implications 
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A general conclusion emerging from present study is that aid in itself will not ensure 
developmental success but it can effectively stimulate the process. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that foreign assistance does not automatically increase growth and that in the case it does 
promote growth, past success does not guarantee future progress. Therefore, foreign aid has to be 
wisely spent so that it can effectively boost economic development and simultaneously offset 
any detrimental effects from aid scaling. This subsection will discuss some suggestions about 
how best to improve the aid effectiveness with the Vietnam experience.  
First of all, the analysis suggests that Vietnamese government and its donor community should 
put more effort into improving the coordination among involved parties. It is the fact that the 
recipient and its donors have continually emphasized the need for more harmonious and effective 
partnership but the task seems to be fairly challenging and requires working together much more 
efficiently. The inconsistent coordination among ministries and sectors, between central and 
local authorities, and with the donors might be one reason why the rate of aid disbursement in 
Vietnam has always been at low level. It is also partially attributed to the very high transaction 
costs and the duplication in aid implementing procedure in Vietnam, which consequently may 
reduce the rate of return to aid. Hence, working in true partnership, which ensures smooth, 
transparent, and effective coordination among partnership groups is a prerequisite for enhancing 
aid effectiveness. One problem arising from partnership relationship is that a large group of 
donors demonstrates the need for a common country assistance strategy among donors but at the 
same time makes it more difficult to build up an effectively aid coordination mechanism for all 
involved partners since there is no ―one size fits all‖. One possible solution is that Vietnamese 
government and the donors may focus on developing a common country assistance framework 
that ensures partnership groups be on the right track to aid harmonization as well as allows them 
to flexibly adapt the best strategy to achieve their desired outcomes.  
Secondly, the analysis implies the importance of systematic evaluations of completed aid 
programs and projects. In other words, improving quality of aid should come before increasing 
quantity. For the case of Vietnam, there are two reasons why the evaluation of granting 
effectiveness becomes absolutely necessary. The first argument is that the results of evaluations 
could shed light on how to mobilize assistance resources to successfully promote development. 
Foreign aid inflow to Vietnam has been needed to facilitate the achievements of numerous 
developmental targets. However, it should be noticed that this financial resource is limited and 
that its provision may carry a relatively high cost to the recipient country. Meanwhile, the aid 
outcomes are diverse across sectors, projects, regions, and partnership groups. The systematic 
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and thorough evaluation of previous aid programs and projects would therefore become a useful 
tool to make sure that the scarce aid resource can be directed to where it can do well. It is not for 
arguing that aid should not be allocated anymore to ineffective projects and programs but that 
what make aid work less well should be addressed and solved before implementing additional 
aid.  
The second reason refers to the necessity to tackle the supposed misuse of some external 
assistance in Vietnam. The movement of taking evaluation seriously is also considered especially 
suitable for the current trend toward non-project based and country system used aid modalities in 
Vietnam. In general, the beneficiary has less incentive to involve in the evaluation process since 
it normally plays passive role in aid partnership and might falsely consider foreign assistance as 
a free gift. Besides, aid agencies sometimes do not consider evaluation as their first priority as 
they spend one group of people‘s money on a different group of people (Easterly, 2003). Thus, 
strict requirements of carrying out evaluations of every aid programs and projects would compel 
both the recipient and its donors to allocate and implement external assistance more responsibly 
and efficiently.  
Thirdly, the quality of institution and managerial capacity should be strengthened in addition to 
aid effort. As discussed in the research, institutional and managerial constraints in Vietnam has 
been severely restricted absorptive capacity and eventually diminished the effectiveness of aid. 
Moreover, foreign assistance has been found to exert negative governance impacts which, if are 
not delicately handled, could impede the aid effort. The endeavor to address those constraints 
needs to be perceived as both recipient government‘s and donors‘ responsibility. From donor 
perspective, the strong emphasis on financial support and technical assistance directing to 
improve the quality of institution and administration might contribute to relax the current 
capacity constraints and accumulate human capital of the recipient country over time. 
Fourthly, the volatility and unpredictability of foreign aid inflow might possibly pose difficulties 
for Vietnamese government in managing fiscal balance. On this basis, the recipient country 
needs to be acutely conscious of the problems involved and then implement necessary measures 
to alleviate pressure on fiscal management. On the revenue side, the beneficiary needs to 
maintain its revenue effort and further strengthen the tax system. Because of the changing nature 
of foreign assistance, it should not be perceived as a permanent and stable source of revenue but 
as a supplementary one that can be used to support development. On the expenditure side, the 
government should formulate more sensible and realistic spending plans consistent with the 
projections of the aid that is likely to materialize. In other words, the fiscal plan would refer to 
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the cognizance of the extent to which variations in aid are expected to be permanent or 
transitory, the rate of aid disbursement, and the future trend of aid inflow. Besides, under the 
circumstance of high volatility and unpredictability, some other measures can be employed to 
smooth out the impacts of aid fluctuation such as foreign exchange reserves or fiscal cushions. 
The combination and measure selectivity might vary over time according to the diverse and 
changing circumstances under which aid has been implemented.  
The final dimension which merits attention refers to the need to adopt a more self-sustainable 
approach in enhancing economic growth in the long-run. It is the fact that loans cover an 
overwhelming and increasing proportion of the current aid inflow compared to grants. Although 
those loans are mainly concessionary, they would certainly impose debt burden on the future 
generations and long-run development of the country. Additionally, Vietnam might graduate out 
of assistant associations in the near future. It hence requires the government to formulate and 
pursue a long-term strategy which would orient the economy toward concentrating on its own 
resources rather than relying on financing from external sources to attain sustainable economic 
growth. For the Vietnam experience, external assistance should be wisely implemented directing 
to where it can eventually help develop the country‘s own resources such as macroeconomic 
management, investment climate, business environment, and human capital. Previously 
successful stories of some Asian countries like Japan or South Korea about how to take full 
advantage of international assistance to become self-financed developed countries might be good 
examples to Vietnam. 
7.3 Limitations and further research  
In order to achieve progress in further research, it is important to point out limitations of the 
present research. One limitation of this study arises from the fact that the sample size for time 
series ARDL analysis is fairly small. It might be argued that the model passes all diagnostic and 
stability tests and that the ARDL model has been shown to be applicable for small sample size. 
Nevertheless, it has been generally admitted that limited time series data would hinder the 
corporation of more robust variables and hence possibly lead to biased empirical results. As 
discussed in the research, the unavailability of data makes it impossible to conduct the model for 
longer time series.  
Another limitation is that the growth regression in the ARDL model does not contain any 
variable measuring the contribution of human capital to economic growth. It is attributed to the 
fact that the available data which captures both quality and quantity of human capital do not fully 
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cover the whole studied period. Besides, the data measuring the quantity of human capital such 
as population or labor force are likely to be weak proxies. Given these methodological 
difficulties, the question whether aid works or not has been approached from different 
perspectives and methods in the present research. Notwithstanding, more research attention 
should be given to develop alternatives addressing these limitations.  
One issue that has not been covered in the present study and deserves further scrutiny is aid 
disaggregation. It is important to note that not all aid provided is intended to increase growth. In 
fact, each type of aid has its own using purpose and target and therefore may influence on 
economic outcomes in a different manner. Additionally, different components of aid are likely to 
achieve different levels of effectiveness. From this perspective, accounting for the heterogeneity 
of foreign aid appears to derive more robust conclusion on the effect of aid on spurring growth. 
Unpacking the aggregate impact of aid also helps to identify which types of foreign assistance 
are key growth drivers. On the basis of better understanding the contribution of each type of aid, 
the recipient government and its donors can accordingly reach to strategy for more efficiently 
allocating the financing resources and hence enhancing the overall effectiveness. Therefore, it 
would be interesting to disaggregate the foreign aid inflow into smaller categories – e.g. project 
aid, programme aid, technical assistance, and food aid - and assess their impacts on growth. 
Finally, poverty alleviation is the other important objective of aid donors and recipient 
government. Whilst the analysis has found convincing evidence to support the significant 
contribution of foreign aid to economic growth in Vietnam, this has not necessarily ensured the 
causal relationship between aid and poverty reduction. On the one hand, some may argue that as 
the marked increase in aid inflow to Vietnam since 1990s has been simultaneous with the 
impressive progress in poverty alleviation, aid seems to be a cure for poverty and inequality 
problem within the country. On the other hand, there might be possibility that external assistance 
has not been oriented toward pro-poor or the magnitude of aid impact has not been sufficiently 
strong to achieve progress in poverty reduction. Hence, a topic of further research in the area of 
aid – growth relationship is the impact of aid on pro-poor growth.  
To close, it seems to be a challenging task to detect the contribution of foreign aid to economic 
growth because the investigation requires considering both numerous perspectives involving 
economic outcomes and the changing nature of aid. Although the present paper still faces some 
limitations, it is hope that this research has provided a comprehensive analysis of the aid-growth 
relationship for the case study of Vietnam. As a result, it guarantees the applicability of the 
research‘s findings in reality and paves the way for further in-depth research.  
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APPENDIX 1: Committed, signed, and disbursed ODA for the period (1993-2012)  
Unit: Million USD 
Table A 1 Committed, signed, and disbursed ODA flow into Vietnam (1993-2012) 
Year Committed Signed Disbursed 
1993 1,860.80 816.68 413 
1994 1,958.70 2,597.86 725 
1995 2,311.50 1,443.53 737 
1996 2,430.90 1,597.42 900 
1997 2,377.10 1,686.01 1,000 
1998 2,192.00 2,444.30 1,242 
1999 2,146.00 1,507.15 1,350 
2000 2,400.50 1,773.12 1,650 
2001 2,399.10 2,433.17 1,500 
2002 2,462.00 1,813.56 1,528 
2003 2,839.40 1,785.89 1,422 
2004 3,440.70 2,598.14 1,650 
2005 3,748.00 2,610.29 1,787 
2006 4,445.60 2,945.69 1,785 
2007 5,426.60 3,911.73 2,176 
2008 5,914.67 4,359.55 2,253 
2009 8,063.87 6,217.04 4,105 
2010 7,905.51 3,207.38 3,541 
2011 7,386.77 6,814.46 3,650 
2012 6,486.00 5,869.36 4,183 
Total 78,195.72 58,432.33 37,597.00 
  Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment   
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APPENDIX 2: Investment Transmission Mechanism 
The investment regression is given as: 
INVit = β0 + β1ODAit + β2creditit + β3INVi,t-1 + β4GDPGit + εit  (A1) 
The table A2 represents the set of estimates of the investment regression. The result reveals that 
foreign aid has a significant positive effect on investment and that investment is one of the main 
transmission through which aid affects growth rate. Therefore, the problem of ―double-counting‖ 
should be addressed by conducting the variable INVRES which accounts for the part of aid-
excluded investment.  
Table A 2 Result for investment regression 
 
Dependent Variable: INV   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -35.77047 19.22784 -1.860348 0.0856* 
ODA 2.703912 1.368896 1.975250 0.0699* 
CREDIT -0.020872 0.030719 -0.679466 0.5088 
INV(-1) 1.472714 0.402995 3.654425 0.0029*** 
GDPG 1.685646 0.606713 2.778323 0.0157** 
     
     R-squared 0.831546    Mean dependent var 31.39356 
Adjusted R-squared 0.779714    S.D. dependent var 4.071817 
S.E. of regression 1.911092    Akaike info criterion 4.363360 
Sum squared resid 47.47954    Schwarz criterion 4.610685 
Log likelihood -34.27024    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.397463 
F-statistic 16.04312    Durbin-Watson stat 2.108584 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     Source: Author‘s calculation 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
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APPENDIX 3: Construction of policy index 
The index of macroeconomic policy index utilized in present paper is calculated by Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) using R software package. PCA is a multivariable statistical 
technique of dimensionality reduction, which enables a set of original correlated variables to be 
transformed into a new set of uncorrelated variables named components. This property allows us 
to apply PCA into a number of variables measuring different aspects of the same concept for 
accurate representation of that concept. As mentioned, the variables that form the policy index in 
present study include government final consumption expenditure as share of GDP as proxy of 
fiscal policy, inflation as proxy of monetary policy, and trade openness measure which is 
(import+export)/GDP as proxy of trade policy.  
Appendix table A3 illustrates the CPA result for generating policy index. As can be seen from 
the table A3, the standard value shows that about 71 percent of the total variance is explained by 
the first component, meaning that it is reasonable to consider the first component as the 
appropriate measure of macroeconomic policy index. Estimation from the first component 
indicates that variable weights for inflation, trade openness, and government expenditure are -
0.4637332, 0.6114885, and 0.6411188, respectively. 
Thus, the policy index calculation is based the following equation: 
Policy index = -0.4637332 * Inflation + 0.6114885 * Open + 0.6411188 * Gexp         (A2) 
Table A 3 Principal Component Analysis results for constructing policy index 
Principal component Standard deviation Proportion of Variance Cumulative Proportion 
1 1.4590 0.7096 0.7096 
2 0.8391 0.2347 0.9443 
3 0.40880 0.05571 1.00000 
Variables Variable weights 
Inflation -0.4637332 
Open 0.6114885 
Gexp 0.6411188 
Source: Author‘s calculation  
Note: Open = trade openness, Gexp = government expenditure 
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APPENDIX 4: The Delta method to estimate standard error 
According to Delta method, the estimator of the asymptotic covariance matrix would be
36
 
Est. Asy. Var [f(b)] = C[s
2(X‘X)-1]C‘  (A3) 
where C= 
𝜕𝜙𝑖
𝜕𝛿 ′
 is Jacobian matrix; C‘ is the transpose of C; [s2(X‘X)-1] is the variance-covariance 
matrix of the coefficients. 
The estimation of long-run elasticities is based on the OLS regression of the equation (13) 
ΔGDPGt =β0 +δ1GDPGt-1+ δ2ODAt-1+ δ3INVRESt-1+ δ4Policyt-1+ δ5Crisist-1 + η1ΔGDPGt-1 + 
ζ0ΔODAt + ζ1ΔODAt-1 + ζ2ΔODAt-2 + ς0ΔINVRESt + ς2ΔINVRESt-2 + ω0ΔPolicyt + ω1ΔPolicyt-1 + 
θ0ΔCrisist + εt    
The long run coefficients for intercept, ODA, INVRES, policy, and crisis are ϕ1=-(
𝛽0
𝛿1
), ϕ2=-(
δ2
𝛿1
), 
ϕ3=-(
δ3
𝛿1
), ϕ4=-(
δ4
𝛿1
), and ϕ5=-(
δ5
𝛿1
), respectively. Least squares estimates of the model parameters 
with standard errors and t ratios are given in Table A4. The estimated long-run elasticities are f1 
= - 
−9.107817
−0.647621
, f2 = - 
0.678005
−0.647621
 , f3 = - 
−0.426522
−0.647621
 , f4 = - 
0.135109
−0.647621
 , f5 = - 
−7.547602
−0.647621
. To compute the 
estimates of the standard errors, we need the partial derivatives of these functions with respect to 
the six parameters in the model: 
G1‘ = 
𝜕𝜙 1
𝜕𝛿 ′
 = [- 
1
𝛿1
, 
𝛽0
𝛿12
, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
G2‘ = 
𝜕𝜙 2
𝜕𝛿 ′
 = [0, 
δ2
𝛿12
, - 
1
𝛿1
, 0, 0, 0] 
G3‘ = 
𝜕𝜙 3
𝜕𝛿 ′
 = [0, 
δ3
𝛿12
, 0, - 
1
𝛿1
, 0, 0] 
G4‘ = 
𝜕𝜙 4
𝜕𝛿 ′
 = [0, 
δ4
𝛿12
, 0, 0, - 
1
𝛿1
, 0] 
G5‘ = 
𝜕𝜙 5
𝜕𝛿 ′
 = [0, 
δ5
𝛿12
, 0, 0, 0, - 
1
𝛿1
] 
Using equation A3, we can now compute the estimates of the asymptotic variances for the five 
estimated long-run elasticities by computing Gi‘[s
2(X‘X)-1]Gi (where i=1,2,…,5). The results are 
-14.0634, 1.046916, -0.6586, 0.208624, and -11.6544, respectively. The five asymptotic standard 
errors are the square roots of above results.  
                                                             
36
 See (Greene, 2012, p. 68) for more detail 
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Table A 4 Regression results for error correction version of ARDL model 
 
Dependent Variable: D(GDPG)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -9.107817 2.803378 -3.248872 0.0831 
GDPG(-1) -0.647621 0.119609 -5.414496 0.0325 
ODA(-1) 0.678005 0.269050 2.519998 0.1279 
INVRES(-1) -0.426522 0.043122 -9.891137 0.0101 
POLICY(-1) 0.135109 0.013800 9.790704 0.0103 
CRISIS(-1) -7.547602 0.526785 -14.32768 0.0048 
D(GDPG(-1)) -1.118264 0.126159 -8.863937 0.0125 
D(ODA) 0.007257 0.180961 0.040104 0.9717 
D(ODA(-1)) 2.941965 0.208261 14.12633 0.0050 
D(ODA(-2)) 0.874925 0.082315 10.62903 0.0087 
D(INVRES) -0.312501 0.041244 -7.576879 0.0170 
D(INVRES(-2)) 0.751377 0.060353 12.44972 0.0064 
D(POLICY) 0.155953 0.011979 13.01892 0.0058 
D(POLICY(-1)) 0.092359 0.006748 13.68657 0.0053 
D(CRISIS) -2.820947 0.171429 -16.45553 0.0037 
     
     R-squared 0.999299    Mean dependent var -0.260970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994396    S.D. dependent var 1.139137 
S.E. of regression 0.085279    Akaike info criterion -2.461146 
Sum squared resid 0.014545    Schwarz criterion -1.725958 
Log likelihood 35.91974    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.388067 
F-statistic 203.7790    Durbin-Watson stat 1.984842 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.004894    
     
     Source: Author‘s calculation 
 
